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INTRODUCTION
Reports of rampant juvenile crime pervade the media.' Youth
crime and victimization have reached epidemic proportions, both
within the context of gangs and without.2 Public outcry has been in-
tense, as politicians and commentators nationwide search for effective
ways to stem the tide ofjuvenile violence and victimization.3 Among
1 See, e.g., Eric Ferkenhoff, 15-Year-Old Held in School Slaying CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 1999,
Metro Northwest, at 1; 15-Year-Old Is Arrested in Bomb Threat at Schoo4 N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
1998, at B4; Mark Obmascik, High School Massacre: Columbine Bloodbath Leaves Up to 25 Dead,
DENY. POST, Apr. 21, 1999, at 1A; John Schwartz, Boys' Ambush at Ark. School Leaves 5 Dead,
WASH. PoST, Mar. 25, 1998, at Al; David Weber & Beverly Ford, Boy, 13, Nabbed in Plot to
Bum Hub School and Students, BOSTON HERtaD, Nov. 20, 1998, at 1; see also Kay S. Hymowitz,
Kids Today Are Growing Up Way Too Fast, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1998, at A22 (detailing in-
creased risk behavior among pre-teen-aged children, as reflected in crime statistics, surveys
on sexual activity, and surveys on substance abuse).
2 From 1988 to 1997, the total number of persons under 18 years of age arrested for
violent crimes rose by almost 50%. See FBI, UNmFORm CReME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNrrED
STATES 1997, at 226 tbl.32 (1998). In comparison, the total number of arrests in the same
category for persons 18 and older rose by 19%. See id. In 1997, the total number of mur-
der victims aged 18 and over was more than 13,000, while there were over 1700 murder
victims under the age of 18. See id. at 18 tbl.2.5. Similarly, over 9800 murder offenders
were 18 and over, compared to approximately 1500 murder offenders under the age of 18.
See id. at 18 thl.2.6. The 20- to 24-year-old age group contained the largest number of both
murder victims and offenders. See id. at 18 tbls.2.5-.6. Although the 20- to 24-year-old age
group contains the largest number of both murder victims and offenders, the significant
increases in both victims and offenders that are 18 and under have arguably been a greater
motivating factor in increased law enforcement efforts. See id. at 226 tbl.32. More recently,
however, the juvenile violent crime rate has been declining. See FBI, UNiFORM CRIm RE-
PORTS: CRRAE IN THE UNITED STATES 1998, at 216 tbl.34 (1999) (showing a 19.2% decrease
in the total number ofjuvenile arrests for violent crime during the five-year period of 1994-
1998).
s For a discussion of various policy initiatives addressing the problem of juvenile
crime, see OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE RE-
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the various measures policymakers have adopted are juvenile curfews,
designed to keep the youth off the streets during the small hours of
night.4 Despite good intentions, juvenile curfew laws raise serious
constitutional concerns. Courts have treated juvenile curfews with
equal levels of applause and disdain, thus leaving communities across
the country with little guidance to enact constitutionally valid cur-
fews.5 In 1993, however, the Fifth Circuit decided a case which alleg-
edly heralded the archetypal curfew statute that could withstand
constitutional scrutiny.6 In Qutb v. Strauss, the Fifth Circuit upheld a
Dallas, Texas juvenile curfew ordinance under strict constitutional
scrutiny in the face of an equal protection challenge.7 Viewing Qutb as
the decisive analysis, countless towns across the country enacted cur-
few laws using the Dallas ordinance as their drafting benchmark.8
FORM INITIATIVES IN THE STATES: 1994-1996 (1997) [hereinafter REFoRm INrrrATmEs: 1994-
1996]. The report addresses the following issues: crime prevention, curfews, parental re-
sponsibility, gang activities, graduated sanctions, juvenile boot camps, youth and guns, ju-
venile records, juvenile waivers, and expanded sentencing authority. See id. at 9-48. The
Office ofJuvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) is one of the five program
bureaus operating under the aegis of the Office ofJustice Programs within the Department
of Justice. See OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, U.S. COV'T MANUAL 1997/1998, at 353-56
(1997). The OJJDP, along with the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics, National Institute ofJustice, and the Office for Victims of Crime, "provide[s] Federal
leadership, coordination, and assistance needed to make the Nation's justice system more
efficient and effective." Id. at 353. OJJDP maintains an excellent website at <http://
www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org>. The site offers access to information and resources on juvenile Jus-
tice programs and includes an on line publication request function.
4 Juvenile curfews vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Generally, they contain pro-
visions that prohibit minors under the age of 17 from remaining in public between 11:00
P.M. to 6:00 A.M. on weekdays and from 12:01 A.M. to 6:00 AM. on weekends. In addi-
tion, curfews generally contain exceptions for activities such as traveling with a parent,
returning from a school function, and engaging in interstate travel and First Amendment
activities. The breadth of the exceptions has a direct bearing on the constitutionality of a
curfew. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2182 to 6-2183 (Supp. 1999); DALLAS, TEX., Crly
CODE § 31-33 (1961); CHARLOTrEsvIuE, VA., CODE § 17-7 (1996); SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICI-
PAL CODE art. 8 § 58.01 (repealed 1997). While a large majority of states define "juvenile"
as a person below the age of 18, some variation exists. For a summary of state definitions,
see HowARD N. SNYDER & MELIssA SIcKamuND, OFFICE OFJUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VIcTMs: A NATIONAL REPORT 73 (1995) [hereinafter
OJDP NATIONAL REPORT]. For purposes of this Note, any reference to "juvenile" includes
individuals within the purview of juvenile curfew statutes, regardless of how a particular
jurisdiction defines "juvenile."
5 Compare Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1258 (M.D. Pa.
1975), afj'd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (unpublished table decision) (upholding ajuve-
nile curfew under rational review), withJohnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072-
74 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (striking down a juvenile curfew as unconstitutionally
overbroad).
6 See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 496 (5th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the Dallas
ordinance "furthers a compelling state interest" and is sufficiently "narrowly tailored").
7 See id. at 496.
8 See Brian J. Lester, Comment, Is It Too Late for Juvenile Curfews? Qutb Logic and the
Constitution, 25 Ho srsA L. REv. 665, 697 (1996) ("After the Qutb decision, cities across the
country enacted curfew ordinances mirroring the Dallas curfew ordinance."); Mark Potok,
Cities Deciding That It's Time for Teen Curfews, USA TODAY, June 6, 1994, at 3A; see also Kim
[Vol. 85:518
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Despite the seemingly settled outlook after the Qutb decision, sev-
eral recent cases have reexamined the constitutional underpinnings
of juvenile curfews and questioned the appropriate analytical treat-
ment. Consider the following three circuit court decisions: In the
1997 case of Nunez v. City of San Diego,9 the Ninth Circuit unanimously
struck down a juvenile curfew ordinance under strict scrutiny. In the
1998 case of Hutchins v. District of Columbia,10 the D.C. Circuit struck
down the city's juvenile curfew in a decision illustrating the immense
confusion concerning the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny.
In Hutchins, each of the three circuit judges applied a different level
of constitutional scrutiny, with two voting to strike it down." The
D.C. Circuit vacated the opinion and granted a rehearing en banc,' 2
in which a plurality reversed the charted course and upheld the con-
stitutionality of the D.C. curfew.'3 Finally, in the 1998 case of Schleifer
v. City of Charlottesville, the Fourth Circuit upheld a juvenile curfew
under intermediate scrutiny in a two-to-one decision.' 4 The Supreme
Court recently denied certiorari in Schleifer,15 marking the third time
the Court has declined to review the constitutionality ofjuvenile cur-
fews.' 6 Each denial of certiorari has let stand a lower court determina-
tion based upon a different standard of review.
Although the curfews in Nunez, Hutchins and Schleifer were struc-
turally similar to the Qutb ordinance, the courts' treatment and results
were markedly varied.' 7 Judicial confusion over the proper analytical
treatment stems in large part from the Supreme Court's view of the
rights of minors. The Court has been loathe to accord minors rights
coextensive with those of adults, and on several prior occasions has
explicitly compromised the fundamental rights of school-age chil-
dren.'8 To complicate matters further, plaintiffs have brought curfew
Webster, After Midnight: Curfew Lacks Major Impact on Youth Crime, TuLsA WoRLD, Jan. 8,
1999, at D1 (noting that "75 percent of U.S. cities with populations of 100,000 or more
have some type of night time curfew for minors").
9 114 F.3d 935, 951 (9th Cir. 1997).
10 144 F.3d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rev'd en ban4 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
11 See id. at 809, 826.
12 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 156 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
13 See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 531.
14 159 F.3d 843, 852 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1252 (1999) ("Thus, [the
Charlottesville curfew] would survive even strict scrutiny if that were the appropriate stan-
dard of review.").
15 See Schleifer, 119 S. Ct. at 1252.
16 The other two times the Supreme Court denied certiorari were in Bykofsky v. Bor-
ough of Middletown, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 964 (1976) and Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S.
1127 (1994).
17 For a discussion of the particulars of each case, including a comparison of the
differences between each of the curfews, see infra Part In.
18 See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) ("[Ulnemancipated
minors lack some of the most fimdamental rights of self-determination-including even
2000]
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challenges under various doctrinal theories, including vagueness and
overbreadth, equal protection, and substantive and procedural due
process. 19 Consequently, this confusion has led to a pervasive lack of
doctrinal uniformity and, not surprisingly, a split in authority. The
Second and Ninth Circuits have held that specific juvenile curfews vio-
lated the constitutional rights of minors,20 while the Third, Fourth,
Fifth and D.C. Circuits have held that other curfew laws were valid
under the state's general police power.21
This Note will address the constitutional parameters of juvenile
curfew laws and propose a uniform doctrinal analysis for adjudication
of constitutional claims. Part I briefly explores the origins, purpose,
and development of curfew laws generally, and surveys the seminal
federal cases dealing with juvenile curfew challenges. Part II discusses
the application of Supreme Court standards in determining whether
the constitutional rights of minors are to be treated equally with those
of adults. Part III discusses the constitutional implications of Hutchins,
Nunez, and Schleifer, and how these cases highlight the systematic lack
of doctrinal uniformity in constitutional adjudication of juvenile cur-
fews. Part IV endeavors to reconcile these recent decisions with the
constitutional foundations of the Qutb model and Supreme Court ju-
risprudence addressing the rights of minors. Finally, Part V argues
the right of liberty in its narrow sense, i.e., the right to come and go at will."); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976) ("The Court... long has recognized
that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of
adults. It remains, then, to examine whether there is any significant state interest in [im-
posing the restriction] that is not present in the case of an adult." (citations omitted));
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968) ("Because of the State's exigent interest in
preventing distribution to children of objectionable material, it can exercise its power to
protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of its community by barring the distribution
to children of books recognized to be suitable for adults." (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broder-
ick, 18 N.Y. 2d 71, 75 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) ("Students in school as well
as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental
rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations
to the State.").
19 See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 144 F.3d 798, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (strik-
ing down curfew as violative of equal protection and due process rights), rev'd en ban, 188
F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072-74 (5th Cir.
Unit A Oct. 1981) (striking downjuvenile curfew solely on the basis of overbreadth); Napr-
stek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1976) (invalidating juvenile curfew
under vagueness doctrine for failing to establish curfew cutoff time); Waters v. Barry, 711
F. Supp. 1125, 1137-38 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding curfew unconstitutional under equal pro-
tection, while rejecting challenge based on Fourth Amendment right to freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure).
20 See Hutchins, 144 F.3d at 816; Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 951 (9th
Cir. 1997); Naprstek, 545 F.2d at 818.
21 See Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 850-51 (4th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 1252 (1999); Quth, 11 F.3d at 496; Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,
401 F. Supp. 1242, 1257-58 (M.D. Pa. 1975), afftd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (unpub-
lished table decision).
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that courts should apply intermediate scrutiny in analyzing the consti-
tutionality ofjuvenile curfew laws. This Part argues that intermediate
scrutiny is fair, workable, and consistent with Supreme Courtjurispru-
dence adjudicating the rights of minors.
I
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CURFEW LAws
An abundance of existing literature details the origins and evolu-
tion of curfew laws. 22 This Note differs in three fundamental ways.
First, this Note analyzes juvenile curfews as they stand today, in light of
the Nunez, Hutchins, and Schleifer decisions. Second, it takes a princi-
pled look at how courts have treated juvenile curfews and ventures to
clarify the import of their decisions. Finally, it argues that applying
intermediate scrutiny is both legally supportable and practically via-
ble. Nevertheless, a cursory review of the older case law and literature
is helpful in cultivating a sense of perspective and understanding of
the unique contours of contemporary challenges to juvenile curfews.
A. Curfew Development in the United States
Curfew laws have been utilized in a variety of contexts and cir-
cumstances throughout our country's history.2 3 For example, prior to
the Civil War, legislators in the South used curfews to keep African
Americans off the streets during certain hours of the night.2 4 Since
the early 1900s, policymakers have usqd curfews in attempts to control
22 See, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, Children, Curfews, and the Constitution, 73 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1315 (1995) (examining the constitutionality of juvenile curfews under different
rights theories); Susan M. Horowitz, A Search for Constitutional Standards: Judicial Review of
Juvenile Curfew Ordinances, 24 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 381, 415 (1991) (arguing for rec-
ognition of a "compelling for children" category of state interests, within the framework of
strict scrutiny); Sam R. Hananel, Recent Development, Qutb v. Strauss, The Fifth Circuit
Upholds a Narrowly Tailored Juvenile Curfew Ordinance, 69 TuL. L. RE:v. 308 (1994) (criticizing
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Qutb v. Strauss); Martin E. Mooney, Note, Assessing the Consti-
tutional Validity ofJuvenile Curfew Statutes, 52 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 858 (1977) (arguing that
strict scrutiny is the appropriate constitutional standard of review); Note, Juvenile Curfew
Ordinance Does Not Violate Constitutional Rights of Minors, 54 TEx. L. REv. 812 (1976) (criticiz-
ing the decision in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown); Note, Juvenile Curfew Ordinances and
the Constitution, 76 MNic. L. REv. 109, 152 (1977) [hereinafter Juvenile Curfew Ordinances]
(arguing that "carefully drafted, sensibly administered" juvenile curfews are
constitutional).
23 For a discussion of the origins of curfew laws, see Note, Curfew Ordinances and the
Control of Nocturnal Juvenile Crime, 107 U. PA. L. Rnv. 66, 66 n.5 (1958) [hereinafter Curfew
Ordinances]. Curfews have been traced back in English history to the times of William the
Conqueror. See id.; see also Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 204 A.2d 688, 690-91 (Md.
1964) (briefly detailing the history of curfews).
24 See Peter L. Scherr, The Juvenile Curfew Ordinance: In Search of a New Standard of
Review, 41 WAsH. U. J. Uaa. & CoNTrvap. L. 163, 164-66 (1992) (summarizing different
applications of the curfew).
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vagrancy.25 During the 1960s and 1970s, authorities imposed emer-
gency curfews to temper race riots. 2 6 Communities have even utilized
curfews as a means to govern access to public parks.27 During World
War I, the Supreme Court sanctioned the imposition of curfews on
Japanese-American citizens for purposes of national security.28 Un-
like juvenile curfews, courts have almost uniformly upheld emergency
curfews,29 justifying them on grounds of exigent circumstances.3 0 Fur-
thermore, emergency curfews are generally limited in scope, duration,
and application.3 '
In contrast to generalized curfews applicable to all persons, juve-
nile curfews are prevalent in our nation's cities.3 2 Curfews have long
been considered an effective means of controlling juvenile crime.33
One of the earliest enactments of a juvenile curfew came at the turn
of the century, motivated by the perception that immigrant parents
25 See Guidoni v. Wheeler, 230 F. 93, 96-97 (9th Cir. 1916) (upholding a curfew re-
stricting vagrancy by unemployed persons after 11:00 P.M.). But see Ruff v. Marshall, 438 F.
Supp. 303, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (striking down curfew which prohibited loitering in public
places of business after business hours).
26 See United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1280 (4th Cir. 1971) (upholding curfew
stemming out of race riots); Glover v. District of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556, 560-61 (D.C.
1969) (same); Ervin v. State, 163 N.W.2d 207, 210-12 (Wis. 1968) (same).
27 See, e.g., Peters v. Breier, 322 F. Supp. 1171, 1172 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (upholding pub-
lic park curfew applicable to all persons).
28 See Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115, 117 (1943) (upholding curfew aimed at
citizens ofJapanese ancestry under emergency war powers); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81, 104-05 (1943) (same); Ex parte Ventura, 44 F. Supp. 520, 523 (W.D. Wash.
1942) (upholding a curfew restricting Japanese-Americans from leaving their homes be-
tween 8:00 P.M. and 6:00 A-M.).
29 See Kevin C. Siebert, Note, NocturnalJuvenile Curfew Ordinances: The Fifth Circuit -Nar-
rowly Tailors"a Dallas Ordinance, But Will Similar Ordinances Encounter the Same Interpretation,
73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1711, 1719-20 (1995) ("[C]ourts have almost uniformly upheld emer-
gency curfews premised on state or federal emergency police powers. ... "). But cf. John F.
Dienelt, Note, Judicial Control of the Riot Curfew, 77 YALE LJ. 1560 (1968) (arguing that riot
curfews should be subject to a "strict necessity" test); Glenn C. Frese, Comment, The Riot
Curfew, 57 CAL. L. Rxv. 450 (1969) (arguing that curfews are justified in exigent circum-
stances, but cautioning against their abuse).
30 See Tona Trollinger, The Juvenile Curfew: Unconstitutional Imprisonment, 4 WM. &
MAR Bi.L RTs. J. 949 (1996). Professor Trollinger, a former ACLU attorney who served as
plaintiffs' counsel for the challenge in Quth, writes:
In contrast [to generalized juvenile curfews], the emergency curfew is by
definition more narrowly tailored in scope. It is enacted to meet a specific,
short-term exigency, and is limited spatially and temporally to the scope of
the exigency. Emergency curfews address[ ] the extraordinary ramifications
of such natural and human-made disasters as riots, extreme disorderly con-
duct, hurricanes, earthquakes, and war, and typically [are] predicated on a
continuing declaration of a state of emergency.
Id. at 954-56 (citations omitted).
31 See id.
32 See OFFIcE oFJuvENILEJusrcE & DELINQUENCY PEVzWNTOJUENILEJUs-rcE Bu-
LE N: Cuarmv: AN ANswER To JuwvEILE DELINQUENCY AND ViarmzAnoN? 9 (1996) [here-
inafter 1996JuvEILEJusrICE BUL N
33 See Curfew Ordinances, supra note 23, at 66 n.5 (providing a brief history of curfews).
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were not adequately supervising their children. 34 The popularity of
the juvenile curfew diminished thereafter, but reemerged during the
World War II era.3 5 With many parents actively engaged in the war
effort, juvenile control became a significant problem . 6 After the war,
however, juvenile crime continued to increase, spurring further inter-
est in juvenile curfews.3 7 Since then, the political penchant for juve-
nile curfews has closely traced the historical ebb and flow of juvenile
crime.3
In recent years, the juvenile curfew has again become a popular
legislative device in the fight againstjuvenile crime, particularly in the
context of gang violence.3 9 Proponents ofjuvenile curfew laws argue
that curfews serve three essential functions: (1) reducing juvenile
crime, (2) protecting against juvenile victimization, and (3) assisting
parental supervision.40 These rationales are often explicitly stated in
the "legislative purpose" sections of juvenile curfew ordinances.41
Opponents of juvenile curfews attack them on numerous
grounds. First, opponents argue that such measures would undoubt-
edly be unconstitutional as applied to adults.42 Even though only a
small proportion of youths engage in violent behavior, juvenile cur-
fews effectively restrict the rights of all youths within a defined age
group.43 Second, opponents argue that the connection between juve-
nile curfew laws and crime reduction is tenuous at best, as reflected in
34 See id.
35 See Siebert, supra note 29, at 1719.
36 See Curfew Ordinances, supra note 23, at 66-67 n.5.
37 See id.
38 See id.
39 See Gregory Z. Chen, Youth Curfews and the Trilogy of Parent, Child, and State Relations,
72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 131, 134 (1997) ("During the past decade ... local concerns about
juvenile violence and gang-related activity have rekindled interest in curfews directed pri-
marily at youth activity."). But see Note, Juvenile Curfews and Gang Violence: Exiled on Main
Street 107 1-I.v. L. Ruv. 1693, 1709 (1994) [hereinafterJuvenile Curfews and Gang Vwlence]
("[E]ven with the protection ofjudicial review, curfews remain a limited and inadequate
response to the problems of gangs."). Discussion of other anti-gang measures, such as
stop-and-search policies, road blocks, drug sweeps, and gang profiling, is beyond the scope
of this Note. For a discussion of these issues, see Jonathan Hangartner, Comment, The
Constitutionality of Large Scale Police Tactics: Implications for the Right of Intrastate Trave4 14
PAcE L. REv. 203 (1994) (discussing police "sweep" tactics).
40 See, e.g., Jeremy Toth, Note, Juvenile Curfew: Legal Perspectives and Beyond, 14 IN PUB.
INTREsr 39, 81-82 (1994-95) (arguing in favor of utilizing juvenile curfews to control the
emergency status ofjuvenile crime).
41 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2181(e)(1)-(3) (Supp. 1999); DAIIAS, TEX., Crr CODE
§ 31-33 (1960); CARLoarsvL. E, VA., CODE § 17-7 (1996);.
42 See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964, 965 (1976), denying cert. to
535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976), aft'g401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (Marshall,J., dissent-
ing) ("[A]bsent a genuine emergency, a curfew aimed at all citizens could not survive
constitutional scrutiny." (citations omitted)).
43 See REFORm INmATrvEs: 1994-1996, supra note 3, at 3 ("[L]ess than one-half of 1
percent ofjuveniles in the Nation were arrested for a violent offense in 1994.")
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statistics which indicate that juvenile crime peaks during the after-
school hours.44 Third, opponents argue that curfews do not treat the
causes of juvenile crime, but rather treat the symptoms.45 In other
words, methods which are more effective and less restrictive than gen-
eralized juvenile curfews exist for reducing juvenile crime and victimi-
zation.46 Finally, opponents argue that curfew enforcement diverts
scarce resources from efforts to combat more serious crimes.47
State courts entertained the earliest juvenile curfew challenges
and continue to serve as the forum for certain cases. 48 State court
challenges are equally as varied as the federal cases and illustrate
44 See OFFmCE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS
AND VICTIMS: 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 26 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 UPDATE ON
VIOLENCE].
45 See REFoRM INrATrvEs: 1994-1996, supra note 3, at 14-15.
46 See infra Part V.B for a discussion of alternative measures ofjuvenile crime control.
47 SeeJuvenile Curfews and Gang Viwlenee, supra note 39, at 1699.
48 The earliest state cases upholding the validity of juvenile curfews include the fol-
lowing People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498, 501-03 (Cal. 1945) (upholding curfew under state
and federal constitutions); Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 204 A.2d 688 (Md. 1964) (up-
holding validity of four-day Labor Day weekend curfew applicable to persons under 21
years of age); and Baker v. Steelton Borough, 17 Dauphin County Rep. 17 (Pa. C. 1912) (re-
jecting equal protection challenge brought under the Fourteenth Amendment). Later
cases upholding the validity ofjuvenile curfews include the following: In re Appeal in Mari-
copa County, 887 P.2d 599, 609-11 (Ariz. App. 1994) (holding curfew was not unconstitu-
tionally broad or vague); In re Nancy C., 105 Cal. Rptr. 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (upholding
curfew and following People v. Walton); In rejM., 768 P.2d 219, 222-23 (Colo. 1989) (find-
ing that minors' rights are not coextensive with those of adults in upholding juvenile cur-
few); Village of Deerfield v. Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 12, 14-15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (rejecting
contention that village ordinance impermissibly conflicted with state legislation because
the ordinance was more expansive); People v. Chambers, 360 N.E.2d 55 (Ill. 1976) (uphold-
ing statewide juvenile curfew despite challenges under free speech, assembly and associa-
tion grounds); People v. Smith, 276 N.W.2d 481, 483-84 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that
occurrence of an investigatory stop of a youthfifl-looking 19-year old is not sufficient
grounds to invalidate juvenile curfew); City ofEastlake v. Ruggiero, 220 N.E.2d 126 (Ohio C.
App. 1966) (upholdingjuvenile curfew as necessary policy regulation); and City of Milwau-
kee v. KF, 426 N.W.2d 329, 340 (Wis. 1988) (holding that ajuvenile curfew which prohib-
ited minors from "congregating" in public areas during curfew hours was not
unconstitutionally vague).
The earliest state cases invalidating juvenile curfews include the following: Ex parte
McCarver, 46 S.W. 936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898) (invalidating curfew because it infringes on
the rights of minors and usurps the parental function); and Alves v. Justice Cour 306 P.2d
601 (Cal. C. App. 1957) (invalidating juvenile curfew under state and federal constitu-
tions). Later cases invalidating curfews include: SW. v. State, 431 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (invalidating curfew in part because of the potential for selective enforcement
of a special emergency permit exception); In refDoe, 513 P.2d 1385 (Haw. 1973) (invalidat-
ing juvenile curfew under vagueness and overbreadth); Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d
478 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (striking down ajuvenile curfew as a denial of equal
protection and as unconstitutionally vague); In re Michael G., 416 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1979) (holding that police lacked authority to arrest juveniles for curfew violations
because the village lacked statutory authority); In re Mosier, 394 N.E.2d 368 (Ohio Ct. C. P.
1978) (invalidating curfew under equal protection, holding that differential application to
high school graduates and non-graduates has no rational basis); and City of Seattle v. Pull-
man, 514 P.2d 1059 (Wash. 1973) (invalidating curfew for unconstitutional vagueness).
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many of the same doctrinal questions surrounding juvenile rights.49
On the federal level, the seminal case adjudicating the constitutional-
ity of juvenile curfews is Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown.50
B. The U.S. Supreme Court Denies Certiorari: Bykofsky v.
Borough of Middletown
In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, a mother and her twelve-year-
old son challenged the juvenile curfew enacted by Middletown, a rural
Pennsylvania town.51 The U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania upheld the ordinance under rational review. 52 The
Third Circuit affirmed the decision without opinion, and the U.S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari.5 3 Justice Marshall dissented from
denial of certiorari, arguing that if the town had aimed the curfew at
the general population, the courts would undoubtedly strike the law
down.54 The underlying issue governing the case, Justice Marshall
wrote, "is whether the due process rights of juveniles are entitled to
lesser protection than those of adults."55 Precisely this question con-
tinues to haunt the constitutional parameters of juvenile curfews56
and foreshadowed the significance of the Supreme Court's decision in
Bellotti v. Baird, discussed in Part II.
1. District Court Proceedings in Bykofsky
Although the Supreme Court declined to review the decision in
Bykofsky, the district court opinion crystallizes many of the issues that
bear on the juvenile curfew's constitutionality. Specifically, the opin-
ion lays out the doctrinal questions that remain sources of confusion
and controversy. Plaintiffs challenged the curfew on numerous
grounds: (1) vagueness; (2) the First Amendment freedom of speech,
49 See, e.g., Frank DeLucia, Comment, Connecticut's Juvenile Curfew Ordinances: An Effec-
tive Meansfor CurbingJuvenile Crime, or an Unconstitutional Deprivation of Minors'Fundamental
Rights?, 15 QuINNIPIAC L. REv. 357 (1995) (examining state and federal juvenile curfew
cases and arguing that similar ordinances in Connecticut are unconstitutional); Susan L.
Freitas, Note, After Midnight: The Constitutional Status ofJuvenile Curfew Ordinances in Califor-
nia, 24 HASTnrGs CONSr. L.Q. 219 (1996) (examiningjuvenile curfews under federal and
California laws); Natalie M. Williams, Comment, Updated Guidelines forJuvenile Curfews: City
of Maquoketa v. Russell, 79 IowA L. REv. 465 (1994) (examining a decision of the Iowa
Supreme Court and arguing for its use as a model for future drafting).
50 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (unpub-
lished table decision), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
51 See id. at 1242.
52 See id. at 1256.
53 See Bykofsky, 535 F.2d at 1245.
54 See Bykofsky, 429 U.S. at 965 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 965 (Marshal, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
56 See id. at 965, 966 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I believe this case poses a substantial
constitutional question... which is of importance to thousands of towns with similar ordi-
nances." (citation omitted)).
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association, and assembly; (3) the due process right to freedom of
movement; (4) the fundamental right of interstate travel; (5) the con-
stitutional right of intrastate travel; (6) the parents' constitutional
right to control their child's upbringing; and (7) equal protection.57
The opinion addresses each of the plaintiffs' claims separately.
First, the district court found that parts of the ordinance were
unconstitutionally vague.58 The court found that certain phrases,
such as "normal... night-time activities,"59 were not defined with suf-
ficient clarity to provide fair warning and notice of prohibited activ-
ity.60 However, the court utilized the curfew's severability clause to
delete the problematic phrases and thus saved the curfew from consti-
tutional infirmity.61 Second, the district court addressed the substan-
tive due process claim, noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has not yet
articulated the special factors that determine how existing frameworks
for analyzing the rights of adults are to be applied to minors."62 The
district court surveyed Supreme Court jurisprudence addressing the
rights of minors63 and concluded that minors' rights are not coexten-
sive with those of adults.64 Because the ordinance did not implicate a
fundamental right or suspect classification, the district court con-
cluded that rational review was the appropriate standard. 65 In apply-
ing this standard, the court found that the curfew advanced "the
purposes for which it was enacted" and hence passed constitutional
muster. 66
Third, with respect to the First Amendment overbreadth claim,
the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim on three grounds: (1) the ordi-
nance contained an exception for First Amendment activities; (2) the
notice provision in the ordinance was less restrictive than parade-li-
57 See Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1248.
58 See id. at 1250.
59 Id.
60 See id.; see also Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 806 U.S. 451, 458 (1939) (invalidating on
vagueness grounds a state statute that made it a criminal offense to be a gangster, which
included in its definition someone "known to be a member" of a gang).
61 See Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1250-52. The Middletown ordinance states in relevant
part:
Gonstruction. Severability is intended throughout and within the provisions
of the Curfew Ordinance. If any provision, including inter alia any excep-
tion, part, phrase or term, or the application thereof to any person or cir-
cumstance is held invalid, the application to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected thereby and the validity of the Curfew
Ordinance in any and all other respects shall not be affected thereby.
MIDDLETOWN, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES, CH. VI, § 9 (1975).
62 Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1253.
63 See id. at 1253-54.
64 See id. at 1254; see also infra Part ll.B (discussing cases that analyze the constitutional
rights of minors).
65 See Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1256, 1264.
66 Id. at 1256.
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censing requirements that the U.S. Supreme Court upheld in Cox v.
New Hampshire,67 and (3) important governmental interests advanced
in the ordinance outweighed the incidental limitations on the minor's
First Amendment right to associate for social purposes.68
In addressing the fourth claim-violation of the right to inter-
state travel-the court noted the Middletown curfew contained an ex-
ception which ensured "that the ordinance in no way impinges on the
right to interstate travel."69 Fifth, the court rebuffed the plaintiff s in-
trastate travel argument, holding that, "[f] or the reasons set forth pre-
viously in the substantive due process section,. . .the governmental
interests furthered by the curfew ordinance override[ ] the minor's
constitutional right to intrastate travel."70
With regard to the plaintiffs' sixth claim, based on the parental
right to determine their children's upbringing, the court first noted
that these rights, while constitutionally protected, are not absolute.7'
The court concluded that this right, "upon which the ordinance in-
fringes only minimally, is outweighed by [Middletown's] interest in
protecting immature minors and in controlling and preventing noc-
turnal juvenile mischief and crime." 72
Finally, with regard to the equal protection claim, the court
noted that age itself is not a suspect classification. 73 Because the ordi-
nance did not infringe upon a fundamental right or implicate a sus-
pect classification, the district court held that heightened review was
not warranted and upheld the curfew under rational review.74 Subse-
quent cases adjudicating juvenile curfews built on the analysis used in
Bykofsky. Although the juvenile curfew in Bykofsky contained certain
constitutional safeguards to ward off vagueness and overbreadth chal-
lenges, subsequent curfews failed to follow its teachings.
67 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (upholding content-neutral municipal ordinance that re-
quired a permit for parades and public meetings).
68 See Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1258-60. See infra Part IV.B.2 for a discussion of the
First Amendment exception to juvenile curfews.
69 Id. at 1261. One of the curfew's exceptions reads as follows:
When the minor is, with parental consent, in a motor vehicle. This contem-
plates normal travel. From excess of caution, this clearly exempts bona fide
interstate movement through Middletown, particularly on normal routes
such as the Pennsylvania Turnpike, Route 230 (Main Street) ... This also
exempts interstate travel beginning or ending in Middletown.
MIDDLETONVN, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. VI, § 50) (1975) (emphasis added).
70 Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1261; see also infra Part IV.B.1 (explaining various ap-
proaches to reviewing a claim of a right to intrastate travel).
71 See Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1262.
72 Id. at 1264.
73 See id. at 1265.
74 See id. at 1266.
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2. Post-Bykofsky, Pre-Qutb Juvenile Curfew Cases
After Bykofsky, only four federal cases examined juvenile curfews
until the 1993 Fifth Circuit decision of Qutb.75 Three of these deci-
sions, however, are of limited utility in the current discussion, because
the invalidations were based on defects easily cured by legislative revi-
sion. Their usefulness lies primarily in focusing the sources of doctri-
nal confusion plaguing juvenile curfew adjudication. More
specifically, these decisions have clarified the constitutional dividing
line for adjudication under the overbreadth and vagueness doc-
trines.76 Consequently, as the fourth of these cases illustrates, doctri-
nal confusion gravitates toward equal protection and substantive due
process.
The first federal juvenile curfew case to arise after Bykofsky was
Naprstek v. City of Norwich.77 In Naprstek, the Second Circuit struck
down ajuvenile curfew on vagueness grounds. 78 The court found that
the Norwich statute's failure to define the hour of termination for the
curfew "renders the ordinance susceptible to arbitrary, capricious and
erratic enforcement, and therefore it is unconstitutional in its
application."7 9
In the second case, Johnson v. City of Opelousas,8o the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Louisiana upheld the city's curfew
law, rejecting the standard-fare constitutional challenges.8' The Fifth
Circuit reversed, however, striking down the juvenile curfew under the
overbreadth doctrine due to its lack of exceptions.8 2 The curfew ap-
plied to minors under seventeen and contained only two exceptions:
(1) accompaniment by a parent and (2) emergency errand.83 The
court expressed concern over the scope of prohibited behavior, not-
ing that none of the prior federal cases dealt with curfew laws that
"encompassed nearly the breadth of the Opelousas ordinances."8 4
Consequently, the court struck down the ordinance, though it "ex-
75 See McCollester v. City of Keene, 668 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1982); Johnson v. City of
Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981); Naprstek v. City of Nonvich, 545
F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1976); Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
76 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE LJ. 853
(1991) (delineating the contours of the overbreadth doctrine).
77 545 F.2d 815, 818.
78 See id. at 818.
79 Id.
80 488 F. Supp. 433 (W.D. La. 1980), rev'd 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. UnitA Oct. 1981).
81 The court rejected the plaintiffs' challenges based on the First, Fifth, and Four-
teenth Amendments. The court did, however, strike a portion of the ordinance as imper-
missibly vague, but utilized the curfew's severability clause to save the ordinance from
constitutional infirmity. See id. at 440-44. This approach is consistent with BykofsAy. See
supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
82 See Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1074.
83 See id. at 1067 n.1.
84 Id. at 1071.
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pressly limited [its holding] to the unconstitutional overbreadth of
the ordinance. 85
In McCollester v. City of Keene,8 6 the third case in the series, the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Hampshire invalidated the city's
juvenile curfew.87 Although the court rejected the plaintiffs' vague-
ness claim,88 it struck down the curfew under the overbreadth doc-
trine.8 9  Specifically, the court noted that the curfew lacked
exceptions for interstate travel, emergency errands, and activity on a
neighbor's property.90 The District Court stated that the curfew "re-
stricts the rights of parents and their minor children ... substan-
tial[ly] and without the state interest necessary to justify such [an]
intrusion."91 The plaintiffs' victory, however, was short-lived. On ap-
85 Id. at 1074.
86 514 F. Supp. 1046 (D.N.H. 1981), rev'd, 668 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1982).
87 On July 3, 1980, the city of Keene enacted ajuvenile curfew which prohibited per-
sons under 16 from remaining in public after 9:00 P.M. unless accompanied by a parent,
guardian, or other suitable person. See id. at 1047. Two weeks later, the city extended the
curfew to 10:00 P.M. See id. After suit was filed, the city amended the curfew as follows:
1. That the curfew which goes into effect at 10:00 PM each evening in
Keene shall end at 5:00 AM on the following morning.
2. That the curfew shall apply to the persons under the age of 16 years
who are not accompanied by a parent or legal guardian or by another
person over the age of 18 years authorized or approved by the child's
parent or guardian.
3. That 'public place' be defined as parks, playgrounds, schoolyards, gov-
ernmental building yards, vacant lots, municipal parking lots and park-
ing lots open to the public (such as parking lots of supermarkets,
restaurants, movie theaters and other places of public
accommodation).
4. That 'public street' be defined as streets, sidewalks, and private ways
open to public use.
5. That the curfew shall be inapplicable to those persons under the age of
16 years who shall be en route to or from the following.
1. A place of his or her employment,
2. A restaurant, library, movie theater, store or other place of public
accommodation,
3. A play, dance, sporting event or other event of public
entertainment,
4. A church, meeting hall, school, courthouse or other place of public
assembly or worship.
Except, however, in the case of public employment, the above exception
for travel shall not excuse any person under the age of 16 years from the
curfew beyond 12:00 midnight.
6. That 'being' on a public street or in a public way shall include being in
or on a motor vehicle.
Keene, N.H., Resolution 81-4A (Feb. 5, 1981).
88 See McCollester, 514 F. Supp. at 1049 ("The ordinance as written provides adequate
and fair warning of the prohibited conduct and does not place unfettered discretion in the
hands of either enforcement officials or judges and juries.").
89 See id. at 1053 ("[We are] compelled to strike down this ordinance because it un-
duly overburdens minors' rights and does not fit within the state's interests validated by
BellottL.. ."); see infra Part HA (describing the Bellotti decision).
90 See McCollester, 514 F. Supp. at 1052.
91 Id. at 1053.
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peal, the First Circuit reversed the district court's decision onjurisdic-
tional grounds. 92 The court found no actual "case or controversy"
capable of adjudication; the complaint "failed to allege the conduct in
which the plaintiff intended to engage," or any real risk of "direct in-
jury from enforcement of the [ordinance] ."g
Finally, Waters v. Bair 4 involved a challenge to the juvenile cur-
few enacted by the District of Columbia.95 The Waters opinion is sig-
nificant for two reasons. First, it brings the due process and equal
protection issues back to the forefront of judicial attention. 96 In its
analysis, the court stressed the importance of a minor's fundamental
right of freedom of movement and found that a restriction of this
right warranted strict scrutiny.9 7 The court explicitly disagreed with
Bykofsky's conclusion that states may give less deference to minors'
constitutional rights and found that the curfew was not narrowly tai-
92 See McCollester v. City of Keene, 668 F.2d 617, 621-22 (1st Cir. 1982).
93 Id. at 620 ("An allegation as to what the plaintiff personally intends to do is neces-
sary to show that not only she but also her intended conduct are at least plausibly within
the potential reach of the statute or ordinance.").
94 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
95 The D.C. curfew in effect at the time of Waters read, in pertinent part:
(a) The Council of the District of Columbia ("Council") imposes a curfew
on minors in the District of Columbia ("District") between the hours of
11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. each day, except that on Friday and Saturday
evenings the curfew shall commence at 11:59 p.m. ("curfew hours").
(b) It shall be unlawful for a parent knowingly to permit or, by negligent
failure to exercise reasonable control, allow his or her minor child to
remain on any street, sidewalk, park, or other outdoor public place
within the District during the curfew hours.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any minor to remain in or upon any street,
sidewalk, park, or other outdoor public place in the District during the
curfew hours.
(d) This section shall not apply:
(1) When a minor is accompanied by a parent;
(2) When a minor is returning home by way of a direct route from an
activity that is sponsored by an educational, religious, or non-profit
organization...
(3) When a minor is traveling in a motor vehicle;
(4) When a minor is acting within the scope of legitimate employment
... and the minor has in his or her possession a copy of a valid
work or theatrical permit or an affidavit from the employer; or
(5) When, due to reasonable necessity:
(A) A minor who is a custodial parent is engaged in an emergency
errand that is directly related to the health or safety of his or
her child and the minor describes the nature of the health or
safety emergency; or
(B) A minor is engaged in an emergency errand and the minor
has in his or her possession, if practicable, a written statement
signed by the parent ....
District of Columbia, Temporary Curfew Emergency Act of 1989, No. 8-325 (Apr. 14,
1989). For the current juvenile curfew in effect, see D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2182 to 6-2183
(Supp. 1999).
96 See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1134-37, 1138-40.
97 See id. at 1135.
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lored to serve its compelling interest of crime reduction. 9 8 Conse-
quently, the court invalidated the D.C. curfew, finding that it violated
the plaintiffs' equal protection and substantive due process rights.9 9
Second, the court analyzed the curfew under the Fourth Amend-
ment's guarantee to freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure. 10 0 The court rejected this Fourth Amendment challenge,
holding that the detention and arrest of youthful-looking violators
who could not produce documentation did not render the curfew
unconstitutional. 10 1
Naprstek, Johnson, McCollester, and Waters further refine the issues
that Bykofsky enunciated several years earlier.10 2 Specifically, they de-
fine the constitutional boundaries of juvenile curfews under vague-
ness, overbreadth, and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. As
illustrated in Waters, however, substantive due process and equal pro-
tection challenges remain controversial.
C. The Fifth Circuit Upholds Juvenile Curfew Under Strict
Scrutiny: Qutb v. Strauss
In Qutb v. Strauss, the Fifth Circuit upheld a Dallas, Texas, juve-
nile curfew ordinance under strict scrutiny.'0 3 The ordinance prohib-
ited persons under the age of seventeen from remaining in a public
place between the hours of 11:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M., Sunday through
Thursday, and between 12:01 A.M. and 6:00 A.M. on Friday and Satur-
day. The ordinance, however, contained numerous exceptions. 10 4
98 See id. at 1136-37 (applying the due process balancing test under Bellotti and con-
cluding that "the Act does not justify differentiating between the constitutional rights of
minors and adults").
99 See id. at 1137-39.
100 See id. at 1137-38.
101 See id.
102 See supra Part I.B.1.
103 11 F.3d 488, 496 (5th Cir. 1993).
104 See DALLAS, TEx., Crry CODE § 31-33 (1961). The ordinance contained the follow-
ing exceptions:
(A) accompanied by the minor's parent or guardian;
(B) on an errand at the direction of the minor's parent or guardian, with-
out any detour or stop;
(C) in a motor vehicle involved in interstate travel;
(D) engaged in an employment activity, or going to or returning home
from an employment activity, without any detour or stop;
(E) involved in an emergency;
(F) on the sidewalk abutting the minor's residence or abutting the resi-
dence of a next-door neighbor if the neighbor did not complain to the
police department about the minor's presence;
(G) attending an official school, religious, or other recreational activity su-
pervised by adults and sponsored by the city of Dallas, a civic organiza-
tion, or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor,
or going to or returning home from, without any detour or stop, an
official school, religious, or other recreational activity supervised by
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Viewing the decision as a victory in the fight against juvenile crime,
numerous towns across the country enacted curfew laws similar to the
one upheld in Qutb.105
In challenging the Dallas ordinance, the plaintiffs asserted nu-
merous constitutional challenges: violation of their First Amendment
rights of free speech and association, violation of their Fourth Amend-
ment privilege against unreasonable search and seizure, violation of
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, and
violation of the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines.'06 The district
court found the ordinance unconstitutional under equal protection
and free association grounds, but did not address plaintiffs' other
claims.107
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo.' 08 The court ana-
lyzed the curfew under both the equal protection and due process
doctrines, proceeding on the assumption that the right to move about
freely was a fundamental right.10 9 Consequently, the court reviewed
the curfew under strict scrutiny, whereby the ordinance must promote
a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored in order
to be constitutional." 0 With respect to the first prong, the Fifth Cir-
cuit was in accord with other courts in finding that the city's interest
in reducing juvenile crime and victimization was compelling."' The
second prong of the court's strict scrutiny analysis, however, was more
troubling.
In support of the narrow-tailoring requirement, the city
presented data indicating that the total number of juvenile arrests in
Dallas had increased from 1989 to 1990 and that violent offenses for
adults and sponsored by the city of Dallas, a civic organization, or an-
other similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor,
(H) exercising First Amendment rights protected by the United States
Constitution, such as the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech,
and the right of assembly; or
(I) married or had been married or had disabilities of minority removed
in accordance with Chapter 31 of the Texas Family Code.
Id. § 31-33(c) (1).
105 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
106 See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 491 n.4.
107 See id. at 491 n.5.
108 See id. at 491.
109 See id. at 492. The court did not actually decide this matter, but rather stated that
"[flor purposes of our analysis, we assume without deciding that the right to move about
freely is a fundamental right." Id.
110 See id.
I11 See id. In view of Bellotti v. Baird, discussed infra Part IIA, the Fifth Circuit recog-
nized that in some instances, the rights of minors may be treated differently than those of
adults. The Fifth Circuit, however, determined that Belotti applied to only the first prong
of the equal protection analysis. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492 n.6. Because all parties agreed
that the state interest was compelling, the court found it "unnecessary to conduct a full
Bellotti analysis." Id.
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all persons (including adults) were most likely to occur during the
hours the curfew would be in effect." 2 The plaintiffs argued, how-
ever, that the city failed to show whether a curfew would have an effect
on the juvenile crime problem. 113 Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted
that the city did not provide data on juvenile crime and victimization
during curfew hours, thus failing to show that the problems were noc-
tumal." 4 The court responded in a footnote, noting that the federal
judiciary "do [es] not demand of legislatures scientifically certain crite-
ria of legislation."" 5 Ultimately, the court found that the city
presented sufficient data to pass strict constitutional scrutiny." 6 Even
without precise data the court held that the city had employed the
"least restrictive means of accomplishing its goals."" 7 Instead of fo-
cusing on the efficacy of the juvenile curfew laws, the court focused on
the breadth of exceptions afforded by the Dallas ordinance." 8 The
Fifth Circuit contrasted the Dallas ordinance with the one invalidated
for overbreadth in Johnson"9 and found that the Dallas ordinance rec-
tified any constitutional infirmities contained in the Opelousas
ordinance. 120
The decisions in Qutb and the preceding cases had some com-
mentators beckoning for Supreme Court guidance.121 However, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Qutb, marking the second time
the Court let stand a lower court decision upholding the validity of a
112 See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493.
113 See id. See infra Part IVa.A2 for a discussion of these evidentiary defects.
114 See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493; see also Trollinger, supra note 30, at 958 ("[T]he city failed
to provide precise data to support its curfew, offering only anecdotal evidence and incom-
plete and noncomparative reports of juvenile crime and victimization." (footnote
omitted)).
115 Quth, 11 F.3d at 493 n.7 (quoting Ginsberg v. NewYork, 390 U.S. 629, 642 (1968)).
For commentary questioning whether such information constitutes a demand for "scientifi-
cally certain" data, see Hananel, supra note 22, who asserts:
[T]he plaintiffs' arguments that the city must supply proof that the ordi-
nance would affect the juvenile crime problem is hardly a demand for "sci-
entifically certain" data. In fact, none of the data provided by the city
actually revealed the number ofjuvenile victims or perpetrators of crimes
during the curfew hours.
Id. at 317 (footnote omitted).
116 See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 494.
117 Id. at 493.
118 See id. at 493-94 ("To be sure, the defenses are the most important consideration in
determining whether this ordinance is narrowly tailored.").
119 See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
120 See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 494 ("By including the defenses to a violation of the ordinance,
the city has enacted a narrowly drawn ordinance that allows the city to meet its stated goals
while respecting the rights of the affected minors." (footnote omitted)).
121 See, e.g., Scott A. Kizer, Note, Juvenile Curfew Laws: Is There a Standard?, 45 DRAKE L.
Ray. 749 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to resolve any
outstanding questions regarding the proper doctrinal analysis for juvenile curfews).
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juvenile curfew.122 Consequently, some commentators have argued
that Qutb will continue to serve as the constitutional benchmark for
valid juvenile curfews, absent a stricter state constitutional standard.123
Others, however, maintain "that the Qutb ruling is not as reliable as
some cities may have originally perceived."' 24
II
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF MNoRs: DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE
LEVEL OF SCRUTINY FOR ADJUDmCATING JuvENIE CURFEW CHALLENGES
The constitutionality of juvenile curfews is predicated on the
threshold question of whether the rights of minors are coextensive
with those of adults. 125 While case law and commentary have long
held that children are entitled to constitutional protections, 126 mi-
nors' rights are not equal to those of adults.127 Competing interests of
individual freedom and state regulation require sensitive balancing
which sometimes compromises the rights of minors. In adjudicating
juvenile curfews, courts have applied three standards of review: strict
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational review.128
When a challenged regulation implicates a suspect class or im-
pinges on a fundamental right, courts apply strict scrutiny.12 9 In ap-
plying this standard, courts will uphold a regulation only if it is
122 See Qutb v. Bartlett, 511 U.S. 1127 (1994); Bykofskyv. Borough of Middletown, 535
F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
123 See, e.g., Craig M. Johnson, Comment, It's Ten O'Clock: Do You Know Where Your Chil-
dren Are? Quth v. Strauss and the Constitutionality ofjuvenile Curfews, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
327, 362 (1995) ("Future state court decisions that may invalidate curfews should not di-
minish the importance of Qutb, where these curfews were either drafted more broadly than
the Dallas ordinance or were evaluated under more protective state laws."); Siebert, supra
note 29, at 1717-18 ("[U]ntil a federal court overturns a similar curfew, the Dallas ordi-
nance will persist as a benchmark for cities across the country." (footnote omitted)).
124 Lester, supra note 8, at 697.
125 See Bykofsky, 429 U.S. at 965 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The question squarely
presented by this case, then, is whether the due process rights ofjuveniles are entitled to
lesser protection than those of adults." (footnote omitted)).
126 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional
rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-de-
fined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and
possess constitutional rights." (citations omitted)).
127 See Note, Assessing the Scope of Minors' Fundamental Rights: Juvenile Curfews and the
Constitution, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1163, 1163 (1984) [hereinafter Assessing Minors' Rights]
("Although there is no longer any doubt that children are '"persons" under our Constitu-
tion' who possess 'fundamental rights which the State must respect,' it is also clear that the
rights of children are not coextensive with those of adults." (footnote omitted)).
128 But cf. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the types of scrutiny that the Court has applied actually reveal
a "spectrum of standards" rather than one of tiers).
129 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982) (striking down a Texas statute that
withheld state funds from local school districts for children who did not lawfully enter the
United States).
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narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 30 Absent a sus-
pect class or infringement of a fundamental right, a regulation need
only pass rational review; in other words, the regulation must show a
rational relationship between its means and stated objectives. 131 The
third standard of review, intermediate scrutiny, has been applied to
quasi-suspect classifications, such as gender and illegitimacy. 3 2 In or-
der to pass muster under this standard, the regulation must be sub-
stantially related to important governmental objectives. 133 In the
context of juvenile curfews, however, mere articulation of a standard
does not determine the validity of the measure. 34 The question,
then, is when and under what circumstances should the courts treat
the rights of minors with lesser scrutiny than those of adults? Because
age itself is not a suspect classification, 3 5 the inquiry turns into an
analysis of fundamental rights. The Supreme Court case of Bellotti v.
Baird'3 6 may have shed some light on whether the rights ofjuveniles
can be subject to greater curtailment than those of adults.' 3 7
A. Bellotti v. Baird: Determining a Juvenile's Right to Abortion
Access
Bellotti involved a challenge to a state abortion-access regulation
requiring parental consent or judicial approval for a pregnant minor
seeking an abortion.'38 In upholding the regulation, the Court out-
lined three factors that enable courts to determine whether a state has
a compelling interest justifying greater restrictions on minors than on
adults: (1) "the peculiar vulnerability of children"; (2) "their inability
to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner"; and (3)
"the importance of the parental role in child rearing.'u3 9 The Court
addressed each of these elements individually, implying that the test
130 See id. at 217.
131 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (upholding the constitutional-
ity of a state cap on welfare benefits to families, regardless of family size or need).
132 See infra Part VA for a discussion of the intermediate scrutiny standard.
133 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (invalidating on equal protection
grounds an Oklahoma statute that prohibited sale of certain alcohol to males aged 18 to
20, but not females of the same age).
I34 But cf Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdom of the Levels of
Scrutiny, 45 OHio ST. L.J. 161, 175 (1984) ("The a priori labels ascribed to governmental
and individual interests tend to preordain their constitutional fate.").
135 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) ("This Court has said repeatedly
that age is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause." (citations
omitted)).
136 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
137 Cf Chen, supra note 39, at 159-73 (arguing that courts should focus on the differ-
ent alignments of interests among the parent, child, and state to determine a minor's
rights in the context ofjuvenile curfews).
138 See Bellott4 443 U.S. at 625-26.
139 Id. at 634.
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could be satisfied by any of the three prongs, rather than requiring a
cumulative inquiry.140
Despite the teachings of Bellotti, courts adjudicating juvenile cur-
fews have not applied the criteria with any degree of uniformity. In-
deed, a lower court's view of the Bellotti criteria has been critical in
determining the level of scrutiny applied.141 The cases can be roughly
summarized as follows: One group of cases has applied the Bellotti
framework to conclude that courts should not diminish juvenile
rights.142 A second group has applied Bellotti to find that minors are
peculiarly vulnerable at night and that their rights are therefore not
coextensive with adults. 143 Still a third group has held that while cer-
tainly relevant, Bellotti must be viewed in light of other Supreme Court
jurisprudence adjudicating the rights of minors.144 Finally, some
judges have chosen not to use the framework at all.14 5 In view of the
confusion regarding Bellotti's import, several questions arise: Is Bellotti
the stand-alone test for determining whether minors' rights should
have lesser protection? Should Bellotti be limited to its facts? Or
should courts view it as relevant in light of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence dealing with the rights of minors?
By its terms, Bellotti does not explicitly embrace juvenile curfew
challenges, but Bellotti's broad language can fairly be read in such a
manner.146 On the other hand, some commentators have suggested
limiting Bellotti's import to cases involving parental consent for abor-
140 See id. at 634-39.
141 See infra Part III for a discussion on how different courts have applied Bellotti
142 See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 144 F.3d 798, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel,
J., concurring) (applying strict scrutiny and arguing that decreasing scrutiny simply on the
basis of age is not warranted), rev'd en bane, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Nunez v. City of
San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The Bellotti test does not establish a lower
level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors in the context of a juvenile cur-
few."); Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1073 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981)
(finding that Bellotti factors do not lessen the standard of review); Waters v. Barry, 711 F.
Supp. 1125, 1136-37 (D.D.C. 1989) (same).
143 See, e.g., Hutchins, 144 F.3d at 809 (Rogers, J.) (applying intermediate scrutiny)
("Viewed in light of factors deemed to be significant in both Carey and Bellotti, juvenile
curfews arise in a context in which children are more vulnerable than adults .... " (cita-
tions omitted)); Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 963 F. Supp. 534, 542 (W.D. Va. 1997)
("[T]he Bellotti factors justify a less stringent standard of review in this case.").
144 See, e.g., Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998) (de-
clining to utilize Bellotti's three-part test, but rather viewing the case in context with other
juvenile jurisprudence), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1252 (1999).
145 See, e.g., Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 531 (Silberman,J.) (applying rational review); McCol-
lester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D.N.H. 1984) (noting that Bellotti "do[es]
not come into play where the innocent behavior of the juvenile creates no risk of delin-
quent activity").
146 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) ("We have recognized three reasons
justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with
those of adults .... .").
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tion.147 Whatever the extent of its influence, it is important to note
three things about Bellotti. First, Bellotti was a four-justice plurality
opinion decided over twenty years ago.148 Hence, it remains unclear
whether the articulated three-prong framework would command a
majority today. Second, the decision does not exist within a vacuum,
but rather as part of the larger framework of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence adjudicating the rights of minors. Indeed, the Bellotti decision
itself relied on other Supreme Court cases which recognized thatjuve-
nile rights were sometimes equal to those of adults and other times
they were not.149 Hence, it would be reasonable to examine Bellottes
foundations to assess its present significance. Third, the Bellotti tripar-
tite test has proven unworkable and inconsistent, as illustrated by the
confusion engendered in the lower courts. Consequently, Bellotti is
certainly relevant, but it cannot be the stand-alone test for determin-
ing whether or when the courts and legislators can treat the funda-
mental rights of minors as lesser than those of adults. 150 The next
section examines cases relevant to Bellotti's foundations.
B. Other Cases Analyzing the Constitutional Rights of Minors
The Supreme Court has examined the rights of minors vis-A-vis
adults under a myriad of fact patterns and circumstances. For exam-
ple, the Court has firmly established that a minor has the following
rights: the right to counsel, 151 notice of charges,152 the right to cross-
examine witnesses, 153 and the privilege against self-incrimination.15 4
Furthermore, minors are entitled to protection against double jeop-
ardy,155 as well as the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in delinquency proceedings involving acts parallel to adult
147 See Toth, supra note 40, at 58 ("The Bellotti court was deciding a highly controversial
issue, an issue having nothing to do with juvenile curfews.").
148 Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger,
Justice Stewart, and Justice Rehnquistjoined. See Bellott4 443 U.S. at 622. Justices Stevens,
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred in the judgment only. See i&L at 652. Justice
White filed a dissenting opinion. See id- at 656.
149 See id. at 633-39.
150 See Horowitz, supra note 22, at 416 (arguing that courts should not use Bellotti "as a
talismanic device to determine the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew ordinance").
151 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (concluding that the Due Process Clause
requires notification of both parents and child as to the child's right to counsel).
152 See id at 33 (concluding that due process requires notice of charges in juvenile
process).
153 See id. at 56 (requiring that juvenile court testimony be subject to cross-examina-
tion, unless the juvenile has made a valid confession).
154 See id. at 55 (concluding that the privilege against self-incrimination applies to
juveniles as it does to adults).
155 See Breed v.Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (holding that ajuvenile court adjudica-
tion of delinquency bars subsequent trial as an adult for the same offense).
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crimes.15 6 Conversely, however, the law withholds from juveniles
some due process rights it grants to adults. For instance, a minor in
juvenile proceedings does not have a constitutional right to a jury
trial' 5 7 or indictment by a grand jury.158 Viewed from a broader per-
spective, the very existence of a separate juvenile justice system evinces
an assumption that 'juvenile offenders constitutionally may be treated
differently from adults."159
The juvenile justice system is not the only arena in which minors
receive differential treatment. For example, even though the right to
vote is considered a fundamental right, 60 the right does not vest con-
stitutionally until a person reaches the age of eighteen.' 6 1 The
Supreme Court has established that states can also set reasonable age
requirements in the "general interest [of a] youth's well being."1 62
Accordingly, states have set age restrictions for the driving privilege,16
the purchase of alcohol,', and employment.165  In the recent
156 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (concluding that the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required in delinquency proceedings).
157 SeeMcKeiverv. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). The Supreme Court's deci-
sion that a jury trial is not constitutionally required in juvenile proceedings was based in
part on the reasoning that such a requirement would "remake the juvenile proceeding into
a fully adversary process .. . put[ting] an effective end to what has been the idealistic
prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding." Id.
158 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966) (holding that the juvenile was
entitled to a hearing before a waiver ofjuvenile court jurisdiction to criminal court was
considered valid).
159 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979). For an excellent overview of the juvenile
justice system, see OJJDP NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 69-95.
160 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (striking down a
poll tax as violative of the Equal Protection Clause).
161 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States, who
are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of age."). The amendment overturned the Supreme
Court's decision in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), which struck down portions of a
federal statute to the same effect as unconstitutional.
162 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (upholding the conviction of a
Jehovah's Witness for allowing a child in her custody to sell literature in violation of a child
labor law).
163 For examples of age restrictions on the driving privilege, see CA. VEH. CODE
§§ 12509, 12814.6 (West Supp. 1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-301 (1981); LA. Rv. STAT.
ANN. § 32:405.1 (West Supp. 1999); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 263:16 (1993); N.Y. VEH. &
TRAP. LAw § 502 (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 1999); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1503 (West
Supp. 1999); Tax. TRANsP. CODE ANN. § 521.201 (West 1999); and VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-
334 (Michie Supp. 1998).
164 Most jurisdictions prohibit the sale of alcohol to individuals under the age of 21.
See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25658 (West Supp. 1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-121
(1981); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26:286 (West Supp. 1999); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 179:5
(Supp. 1999); N.Y. ALco. BEy. CoNT. LAw § 65 (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 1999); 18 PA.
CONs. STAT. ANN. § 6310.1 (West Supp. 1999); Tax. ALco. BEY. CODE. ANN. §§ 106.01-
106.14 (West 1995 & Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-304 (Michie 1999).
165 See, e.g., CAL. L&AB. CODE §§ 1285-1312 (West 1989 & Supp. 1999); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 36-501 (1981); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:166-63, 23:166 (West 1998); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 276-A4 (1999); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 130 (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 1999); PA. STAT. ANN.
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Supreme Court case of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, involving a
challenge to random drug testing of school athletes, the Court held
that "at common law, and still today, unemancipated minors lack
some of the most fundamental rights of self-determination-includ-
ing even the right of liberty in its narrow sense, i.e., the right to come
and go at will.' 6 6 Given the restrictions on movement in the case of
juvenile curfews, this language appears extremely relevant on its face.
The language has surfaced in several decisions addressing the consti-
tutionality ofjuvenile curfews. 167 However, context dictates caution in
using the aforementioned language in that manner. The issues impli-
cated in Vernonia centered around the Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure, as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 168 Vernonia made no mention
whatsoever of the equal protection or due process doctrines. 169
Hence, the dicta in Vernonia provides little guidance for adjudicating
the issues implicated by curfew restrictions.
Having considered existing statutory and judicial limitations on
the rights of juveniles, the next Part will discuss three recent circuit
court cases adjudicating juvenile curfew challenges.
m
CURRENT STATE OF AFFAiRs: THREE RECENT CIRcurr
COURT DECISIONS
The preceding Parts set out the framework in which curfew adju-
dication occurs. This Part will illustrate that the judicial response to
juvenile curfew challenges lacks doctrinal uniformity. The lack of uni-
formity has become even more pronounced as a result of Hutchins,
Nunez, and Schleifer, intensifying an already accentuated split in federal
authority. The ensuing Parts discuss these three circuit court deci-
sions and analyze them in the context of older challenges.
A. Hutchins v. District of Columbia
Confusion over the appropriate level of scrutiny is manifest in the
recent D.C. Circuit case of Hutchins v. District of Columbia.'7" Initially,
a two-judge plurality struck down the District of Columbia's curfew,
tit. 43, § 44 (West 1992); TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. § 51.011 (West 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-
78 (Michie 1999).
166 Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995).
167 SeeSchleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 1252 (1999); Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 144 F.3d 798, 808 (D.C. Cir.
1998), rev'd en banc, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
168 See 515 U.S. at 652-57.
169 See id. passim.
170 144 F.3d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rev'd en banc, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en
banc).
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although the three judges disagreed on the appropriate level of scru-
tiny.171 In October 1998, however, the D.C. Circuit vacated the opin-
ion upon the appellant's Suggestion for Rehearing en Banc.172 The
resulting plurality decision upheld the constitutionality of D.C.'s cur-
few in an opinion underscoring the lack of uniformity within the fed-
eral judiciary.173
In Hutchins, a group of minors under the age of seventeen, their
parents, and a movie theater sued to enjoin enforcement of the Juve-
nile Curfew Act of 1995.174 In challenging the ordinance, the parties
asserted numerous constitutional violations: (1) the violation of Fifth
Amendment equal protection; (2) the violation of due process right
to free movement; (3) the violation of First Amendment rights to free-
dom of expression and assembly; (4) the violation of the vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines; (5) the violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; and (6)
the violation of the due process right to autonomy in raising chil-
dren.175 The ordinance was modeled after the Dallas ordinance up-
held by the Fifth Circuit in Qutb and contained many of the same
exceptions. 176 The district court, however, enjoined enforcement of
the curfew, finding that the Act violated the minors' fundamental
right to free movement, as well as the parents' right to rear their chil-
dren.177 In applying the strict scrutiny standard, the district court
found that the District of Columbia demonstrated a compelling state
interest, but that the curfew was not narrowly tailored to serve that
interest. 178
In its initial decision, the D.C. Circuit struck down the city's cur-
few as unconstitutional. 179 Judge Rogers held that the curfew trig-
171 See id. at 808, 826.
172 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 156 F.d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
173 See Hutchins, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc).
174 See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2182 to 6-2183 (1996).
175 See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 535.
176 See Hutchins, 144 F.3d at 799 ("The [D.C.] Council modeled the Act on a Dallas,
Texas, ordinance that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had held was
constitutional."); see also supra Part I.C.
177 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665, 668 (D.D.C. 1996), reu'd en
banc, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
178 See id. at 674-S0.
179 See Hutchins, 144 F.3d at 817. Before addressing the merits of the case, the court
had to determine whether the case had become moot, because all of the minors who chal-
lenged the ordinance had grown beyond the age of regulation. See id. at 802. The D.C.
Circuit held that the primary challenges to the curfew were moot, because the appellees
were not certified as a class pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
id. at 802. The challenge survived, however, because the court ruled that an appellee par-
ent with a minor child still subject to the curfew has standing to continue. See id. at 802.
The movie theater which joined as co-plaintiff went bankrupt, and its cause was dismissed
as moot. See id. at 802 n.6. See generally CHARLEs ALAN WRGrr, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 13, at 79-81 (5th ed. 1994) (discussing the law of third-party standing).
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gered intermediate scrutiny.18 0 In applying this standard, Judge
Rogers argued that the evidentiary flaws-the age-related and tempo-
ral defects in the statistics-failed to show that the curfew was "sub-
stantially related" to the District's goals.' 81 Specifically, Judge Rogers
noted that because youths aged seventeen or older were responsible
for forty-two percent of the juvenile referrals from 1990 through 1994,
a curfew which excluded this group "lacks a close fit to the goal of
reducing juvenile crime." 82 Furthermore, the statistics offered by the
District regarding violent teen deaths included youths aged fifteen
through nineteen, thus failing to distinguish those youths that the cur-
few would not affect.18 3 Consequently, the statistics "offer[ed] only
weak evidence that the curfew will much reduce the teen violent
death rate."1 84 Judge Tatel concurred in the judgment that the cur-
few failed to survive intermediate scrutiny, even though he believed
that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review, because the
curfew implicated fundamental rights.'8 5 Judge Silberman dissented,
arguing that rational review was the appropriate standard, because the
curfew did not implicate fundamental rights.'8 6 A few months after
the decision, the opinion was vacated upon the appellant's Suggestion
for Rehearing en Banc. 8 7
After a rehearing en banc, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment and upheld the constitutionality
of the city's curfew.'88 Judge Silberman, who had previously dis-
sented, wrote for a plurality of the en banc court' 8 9 Of the eleven
sitting justices, four thought that rational review was the appropriate
standard of review, six thought that intermediate scrutiny was appro-
priate, and one thought strict scrutiny should apply.' 90 The conflu-
ence of various rationales and ideas regarding proper application of
standards resulted in various coalitions of concurrences.
Judge Silberman divided his decision into four parts. Part I of
Judge Silberman's opinion was relatively unobjectionable, and simply
discussed the nature of the curfew and the procedural posture of the
case.' 91 Part II, however, was more controversial. In part II.A., Judge
180 See Hutchins, 144 F.3d at 809 ("The approach reflected in the intermediate scrutiny
test fits comfortably in examining the rights affected by juvenile curfews.").
181 See id. at 811-17.
182 Id. at 814.
183 See id.
184 Id.
185 See id. at 825 (Tatel, J., concurring in judgment).
186 See id at 828 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
187 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 156 E3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
188 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc).
189 See id. at 534.
190 See id.
191 See id. at 534-36.
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Silberman held that the issue was whether the curfew infringes upon a
fundamental right' 92 In deciding whether a fundamental right was
implicated, Judge Silberman framed the issue as whether minors have
a right "to be on the streets at night without adult supervision," rather
than one of freedom of movement. 193 Judge Silberman found that
such a right did not exist.' 94 Consequently, since no fundamental
right had been infringed, rational review was the appropriate
standard. 195
In part II.B., Judge Silberman further rejected the argument that
the curfew infringes upon parents' substantive due process right to
direct and control their children's upbringing. 196 Judge Silberman
conceded that such rights may exist, but that they apply only to inti-
mate family decisions and do not extend to allowing children on the
streets at night. 97 Hence, parents' substantive due process rights
were not implicated by the curfew. Notably, part II of Judge Silber-
man's opinion consisted of a four-judge minority; only Judges Wil-
liams, Sentelle, and Randolph joined in part 11.198
In view of the various concurrences, parts III and IV of Judge
Silberman's opinion can be viewed as giving the most guidance re-
garding the D.C. Circuit's viewpoint. In addition to part II's four-
judge minority, Judges Wald, Ginsberg, Henderson, and Garland
joined in parts I, III, and IV.199
In part III, Judge Silberman concluded that if the curfew did in
fact implicate the fundamental rights of minors, then courts should
apply intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny.200 In applying
intermediate scrutiny, Judge Silberman found that the first prong-
important governmental interest-was easily met: The juvenile violent
crime arrest rate in D.C. was more than three times the national aver-
age; the violent death rate for teens aged fifteen to nineteen was four
times the national average; and D.C. was ranked last in children's
overall well being, almost three times worse than the worst state.201
In applying the second prong-the substantial-relation require-
ment-Judge Silberman found that it too had been met. With regard
to age-related evidentiary defects, the court questioned whether it was
appropriate for the city to enact the curfew based on arrest statistics
192 See id. at 536.
193 Id. at 538.
194 Se id.
195 See id. at 539.
196 See id. at 540.
197 See id. at 540-41.
198 See id. at 534.
199 See id.
200 See id. at 541.
201 See id. at 541-42.
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that included seventeen-year olds and victimization statistics that cov-
ered fifteen- to nineteen-year olds. 20 2 The plaintiffs argued that their
inclusion overstated the problem of juvenile crime.203 In response,
however, the District submitted "more data showing that arrests for
youths under [seventeen] have been increasing steadily."204 Conse-
quently, the court held that the city was not wrong to exclude seven-
teen-year olds, thus making the curfew less intrusive than it could have
been.20 5 With regard to potential time-dimension defects, the District
submitted evidence which showed that "more than 50% of juvenile
arrests took place during curfew hours."206 The court found that this
evidence, coupled with the fact that serious crimes by all age groups
were more likely to take place during curfew hours, demonstrated that
the curfew was "substantially related" to its objectives. 207 Similarly, the
court quickly dispensed with arguments regarding the lack of data in-
dicating where juvenile crime and victimization occur,208 arguments
to limit the curfew to high-crime areas of the city, 20 9 and arguments
that the District was not entitled to rely on the experiences of other
cities.2 10
In part III.BJudge Silberman concluded that the curfew, as far as
it implicates the fundamental rights of parents, also "passes intermedi-
ate scrutiny because it is carefully fashioned much more to enhance
parental authority than to challenge it."211 Specifically, the court held
that " [t] he curfew's defenses allow the parents almost total discretion
over their children's activities during curfew hours."212 Consequently,
Judge Silberman held that the curfew survived intermediate scrutiny,
because it was substantially related to an important governmental
interest.
Finally, part IV of Judge Silberman's opinion addressed the
vaguenegs challenges and categorically rejected each of the plaintiff's
202 See id. at 543.
203 See id. at 542-43.
204 Id. at 543.
205 See id.
206 Id, at 544.
207 See id.
208 See id. (concluding that the fact "that the District did not produce data showing
where juvenile crime and victimization occurred (i.e., that it occurred primarily outside of
the home) [was] not problematic" and further "that a substantial percentage of violent
juvenile victimizations (approximately 33%) occurred on the streets adequately supports
the relationship between the government's interest and the imposition of the curfew").
209 See id. (noting that confining the curfew to high-crime areas "would have opened
the Council to charges of racial discrimination").
210 See id. ("[fln drawing conclusions from.., experiences [of other cities], legisla-
tures are not obliged to insist on scientific methodology.").
211 Id. at 545.
212 Id.
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arguments that the ordinance was impermissibly vague.213 Most nota-
bly, with regard to the claim that the First Amendment exception was
unconstitutionally vague, Judge Silberman wrote that "the curfew...
is no more vague than the First Amendment itself."214 The court also
undertook to resolve the plaintiff's arguments based on the First and
Fourth Amendments. Because the district court grounded its decision
on equal protection and due process, it did not reach the First and
Fourth Amendment claims. 215 Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit "exer-
cise [d] [its] discretion to resolve these purely legal claims in the inter-
est of judicial economy."216 In response to the First Amendment
claim, the court held that "the First Amendment defense by definition
provides full protection, [and] any residual deterrent caused by the
curfew would pose at most an incidental burden on juveniles' expres-
sive activity or right of association." 217 In response to the Fourth
Amendment argument, the court held that the curfew's limitation on
when an officer can make an arrest precisely followed the Supreme
Court's definition of probable cause and was thus constitutional.218
Chief Judge Edwards wrote a separate two-part opinion, concur-
ring in part, and concurring in the result.2 19 Judge Edwards argued
that the curfew law "implicates significant rights of both minors and
parents and, accordingly, is subject to no less than so-called 'interme-
diate scrutiny."' 220 Hence, Judge Edwards concurred in parts I, III.A
and IV, and concurred in the result in part III.B. In part I of his con-
currence, Judge Edwards disagreed with part II.B of Judge Silber-
man's opinion, which stated that parents' rights are limited to
"intimate family decisions."221 Judge Edwards stressed that parental
rights have never been limited to "activities that take place literally
inside the home or literally inside the classroom." 2 22 In part II of his
concurrence, ChiefJudge Edwards applied intermediate scrutiny and
found that the curfew was "substantially related to the protection of
minors from the dangers of juvenile crime."2 23 The primary issue,
213 See id. at 546.
214 Id.
215 See id. at 547-48.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 548.
218 See id.
219 See id. (Edwards, CJ., concurring).
220 Id. (Edwards, CJ., concurring).
221 Id. at 549 (Edwards, CJ., concurring).
222 Id. at 550 (Edwards, Cj., concurring).
223 Id. at 551 (Edwards, CJ., concurring). Judges Wald and Garland joined in part II
of ChiefJudge Edwards's concurrence. CircuitJudges Wald and Garland wrote a brief one
paragraph opinion concurring in part and concurring in the result. See id. at 552 (Wald.,
J., and Garland, J., concurring). They concluded that intermediate scrutiny was the appro-
priate standard for the reasons expressed in the Schleifer opinion, part II of Chief Judge
Edwards's opinion, and part III ofJudge Rogers's opinion. See id. (Wald, J., and Garland,
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Judge Edwards argued, was whether the curfew "adequately accommo-
dates parents' rights to determine what activities are necessary to their
children's upbringing and growth. '224 In view of the extensive excep-
tions, Judge Edwards determined that the D.C. curfew "adequately ac-
commodates parents' rights, because, although parents' decision
making is not unfettered, the law allows parents great discretion in
how to manage the activities of their children."225
Judge Rogers,joined by Judge Tatel, wrote separately concurring
in part and dissenting in part.2 26 Judge Rogers objected to Judge Sil-
berman's characterization that the fundamental right at issue was
whether minors have a right to be unaccompanied on the streets at
night.227 Judge Rogers asserted that the right should be defined with-
out regard to age, and without regard to how it is exercised. 228 Judge
Rogers argued that the right to intrastate tr'el was a fundamental
right and that D.C.'s juvenile curfew impinged on this right, but be-
cause the curfew implicated the rights of minors, intermediate scru-
tiny should apply.229 In applying the standard, Judge Rogers argued
that the requisite fit between means and ends was not present, be-
cause the legislature ignored evidence that almost half of juvenile
crime is committed by persons not subject to the curfew and that most
juvenile crime occurs at times outside the scope of curfew prohibi-
tion.230 Furthermore, the D.C. Council ignored evidence that "more
than 90% of all juveniles do not commit any crimes, at night or other-
wise."23 1 Hence, these statistical defects rendered the evidence insuffi-
cient to withstand intermediate scrutiny.232
Judge Tatel wrote a separate dissent, agreeing with Judge Rogers
that the curfew implicated the fundamental right of free move-
ment 23 3 Although Judge Tatel believed that the court should apply
strict scrutiny, he joined Judge Rogers's conclusion that the curfew
failed to survive intermediate scrutiny.23 4 Judge Tatel focused on the
parental right to upbringing and held that the issue was "not whether
J., concurring). Judges Wald and Garland also joined in parts III and IV of Silberman's
plurality, which upheld the curfew under intermediate scrutiny and a vagueness challenge,
respectively. See id. (Wald, J., and Garland, J., concurring).
224 Id. at 551 (Edwards, CJ., concurring).
225 Id. (Edwards, CJ., concurring).
226 See id. at 552 (Rogers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
227 See id. (Rogers, J., concurring, in part, dissenting in part).
228 See id. at 557 (Rogers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
229 See id. at 562-63 (Rogers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judges Wald
and Garland concurred in the portion of Rogers's opinion which held that a fundamental
right to intrastate travel exists. See id. at 552 (Wald, J., and Garland, J., concurring).
230 See id. at 553 (Rogers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
231 Id. at 566 (Rogers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
232 See id. at 553 (Rogers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
233 See id. at 570-71 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
234 See id. at 571 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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the curfew . . . helps or hinders parental control . . . but rather
whether the District has provided sufficient justification for imposing
the particular restrictions on parental control to which these plaintiffs
object."235 Judge Tatel concluded that "the method it chose so plainly
lacks an evidentiary link to the stated goal that it fails the tailoring
prong of both strict and intermediate scrutiny."236
Although the en banc decision ultimately upheld the constitu-
tionality of the D.C. curfew, the decision-making process was anything
but uniform. The following summarizes the confluence of the various
opinions: Four judges concluded that rational review was the appro-
priate standard of review, arguing that no fundamental right was im-
plicated by the curfew. Each of these judges also concluded, however,
that the curfew would pass intermediate scrutiny, if that were the ap-
propriate standard. On the other hand, a total of six judges believed
that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review. In
applying the intermediate standard, the vote was five-to-one in favor of
upholding the curfew. Finally, one judge argued that strict scrutiny
was warranted, but that the curfew nevertheless failed even intermedi-
ate scrutiny. Consequently, we can glean from these numbers that the
application of intermediate scrutiny by the various concurrences and
rationales garnered a vote of nine-to-two in favor of upholding the
curfew.
B. Nunez v. City of San Diego
Enacted in 1947, the juvenile curfew challenged in Nunez v. City of
San DiegoP37 was not a recent legislative pronouncement.238 In April
of 1994, however, the city precipitated this challenge by adopting a
resolution for aggressive enforcement of the curfew due to increases
in juvenile crime.239 The San Diego ordinance contained stricter
prohibitions than other challenged curfews.240 For example, the cur-
few extended from 10:00 P.M. until daylight the following day, with no
235 Id. at 575 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
236 Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
237 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997).
238 See id. at 938. San Diego's curfew at the time of Nune read, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any minor under the age of eighteen (18) years, to
loiter, idle, wander, stroll or play in or upon the public streets, highways,
roads, alleys, parks, playgrounds, wharves, docks, or other public grounds,
public places and public buildings, places of amusement and entertain-
ment, vacant lots or other unsupervised places, between the hours of ten
o'clock P.M. and daylight immediately following ....
SAN Diu, o, CAL., Mui . CODE art. 8 § 58.01 (1947) (repealed 1997).
239 See Nunez, 114 F.3d at 939.
240 See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text for a comparison with the Dallas,
Texas ordinance.
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extension provision for weekends.2 41 Arguably, weekend extension
provisions undercut the rationale of guarding against youth crime and
victimization, but such provisions also bear on the reasonableness of
curfews and hence the likelihood that they will be upheld.2 42
The plaintiffs, several minors and their parents, brought a facial
challenge to the San Diego curfew under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.243 The
minor-plaintiffs alleged that the curfew restricted otherwise lawful ac-
tivities, such as attending concerts, meeting with friends, and eating
out.2 44 The parent-plaintiffs challenged the parental misdemeanor li-
ability imposed by the curfew, alleging that the ordinance interfered
with their parental right to rear their children. 245 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of San Diego, concluding that the
measure passed strict scrutiny.2 46 The ensuing appeal generated an
enormous amount of interest, with over 100 California cities filing
amicus briefs on behalf of San Diego.2 47
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first examined the question of
vagueness. The court held that San Diego's ordinance was flawed in
two respects. First, it failed to provide reasonable notice of illegal con-
duct. Second, it gave police too much discretion to stop and arrest
juveniles during curfew hours.2 48
The court rejected the city's arguments for a narrow construction
to avoid these defects, but rather allowed a broader interpretation to
address the constitutionality of the ordinance.2 49 In doing so, the
241 See SAN DiEGo, CAI.-, MUN. CODE art. 8 § 58.01 (1947) (repealed 1997). Compare
Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1976), in which the Second Circuit
struck down a juvenile curfew on vagueness grounds for failure to specify a termination
time. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
242 See Curfew Ordinances, supra note 23, at 72 (criticizing the weekend extension provi-
sion as undermining the purpose of the curfew ordinance).
243 See Nunez, 114 F.3d at 939. Section 1983 reads, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) . See generally WRiGHT, supra note 179, § 22A, at 132-40 (surveying
the use of § 1983 as a tool for civil rights litigation); Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983:
Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CoRNELL L. REv. 482 (1982) (surveying
§ 1983 litigation).
244 See Nunez, 114 F.3d at 939.
245 See id.
246 See id.; Nunez v. City of San Diego, 963 F. Supp. 912, 923-24 (S.D. Cal. 1995).
247 See Nunez, 114 F.3d at 939 (noting that "[a]micus briefs in support of the City were
filed by... 113 other California cities").
248 See id. at 943.
249 See id. at 943-44. Compare Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir.
1976), discussed supra Part I.B.2, which held that a failure to specify the time a curfew
ended each morning rendered the ordinance impermissibly vague, and thus unconstitu-
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court noted that the "broader reading may make it more difficult for
the statute to pass constitutional muster on substantive grounds, but it
is required for the ordinance to meet the Constitution's guarantee of
fair notice."
2 50
Moving along to the equal protection challenges, the Ninth Cir-
cuit first noted that the right to freedom of movement is a fundamen-
tal right, thus triggering strict scrutiny.2 51 In response to the city's
argument that these rights are not fundamental for minors, the court
found that Bellotti did not lessen the standard of scrutiny for minors'
rights, but rather it "enables courts to determine whether the state has
a compelling interestjustifying greater restrictions on minors than on
adults."25 2 It further rejected the argument that the language in
Vernonia School District 47Jv. Acton,253 which suggested that minors lack
the right to come and go at will, changed the nature of a minor's right
to freedom of movement.2 54 Hence, the Ninth Circuit concluded
strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review.2 55
In applying the strict scrutiny test, the court easily found that the
city had a compelling interest in reducing juvenile crime and victimi-
zation.256 The court next considered whether the curfew met the nar-
row-tailoring requirement. Although the court expressed concern
regarding the means-and-ends fit between the curfew and the prof-
fered statistics, the court nevertheless did not invalidate it on those
grounds. 257 Instead, the court focused on the lack of exceptions. The
ordinance allowed only four exceptions: (1) accompaniment by a par-
ent or guardian; (2) emergency errand; (3) returning from a school
sponsored activity; and (4) engagement in a legitimate business, trade
or profession.2 58 The curfew had no exceptions for First Amendment
activities or interstate travel.259 Moreover, the court noted that San
Diego rejected proposed amendments "to tailor the ordinance more
tional. In Nunez, however, the court overlooked the vagueness issue and chose to address
the merits of the case.
250 Nunez, 114 F.3d at 943-44.
251 See id. at 944-45. For a discussion of whether the freedom of movement-intrastate
travel-is a fundamental right, see infra Part V.B.1.
252 Nunez, 114 F.3d at 945.
253 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
254 See Nunez, 114 F.3d at 945 ("We decline to extend Vernonia to establish that the
Constitution does not secure minors' fundamental right to free movement against the gov-
ernment acting without regard to the parents' wishes.").
255 See id. at 946.
256 See id. at 947.
257 See id. at 947-48.
258 See id. at 948-49. For a discussion of the contours of individual exceptions, see Part
IV.B.
259 See Nunez, 114 F.3d at 948-49 for a discussion of the interstate travel exception to
curfew regulation, see infra Part IV.B.1.
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narrowly by adopting the broader exceptions used in .. .Qutb."260
Consequently, the lack of exceptions served as the impetus for invali-
dating the curfew on the grounds that it restricted First Amendment
rights and the parents' substantive due process right to control the
upbringing of their children.261
C. Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville
After conducting an extensive study, the City of Charlottesville,
Virginia, enacted a new juvenile curfew ordinance in December
1996.262 The ordinance appears more reasonable than the Qutb
model because of its less restrictive curfew hours.263 The curfew be-
gins at 12:01 A.M. on Monday through Friday, and 1:00 A.M. on Satur-
day and Sunday, lifting at 5:00 A.M. each morning.264 Further, the
curfew applies only to juveniles under the age of seventeen. 265 The
enumerated exceptions are essentially the same as those found in the
Dallas ordinance challenged in Qutb.266 Plaintiffs-five minors under
the age of seventeen, one eighteen-year old, and two parents of mi-
nors-brought suit in federal district court seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief, on the grounds that the juvenile curfew violated their
constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. 267 The district court rejected the claims and upheld
the curfew under intermediate scrutiny.268 Plaintiffs appealed to the
Fourth Circuit.
In determining the appropriate level of scrutiny, a two-judge ma-
jority of the Fourth Circuit considered Bellotti as one of approximately
a dozen cases providing a general analytical framework for determin-
ing the rights of minors; instead of applying Bellotti's three-prong test,
the majority simply viewed it as relevant to the inquiry in the broader
260 Nunez, 114 F.3d at 948-49.
261 See id. at 951. Shortly after the Ninth Circuit invalidated San Diego's curfew, the
San Diego City Council enacted a new juvenile curfew law incorporating the Qutb ordi-
nance exceptions, supra note 104, almost verbatim. See SAN DiEGo, CAL., MUN. CODE art. 8
§ 58.0102 (1997). Other revisions in the curfew include a change in the wording of the
statute to prohibit a minor's "presen[ce] in any public place," and the addition of a defi-
nite termination time of 6:00 AM. Id. The curfew, which continues to be applicable to
minors under 18 years of age, remains in effect. See id.
262 See CHARLorrEsviLLE, VA., CODE § 17-7 (1996).
263 See supra notes 103-24 and accompanying text.
264 See CHARLoi-isviu, VA., CODE § 17-7 (1996).
265 The phrase "under the age of 17" has been the source of confusion in some cases.
For purposes of clarity, the phrase includes juveniles 16 and under, but not 17-year-old
juveniles.
266 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
267 See Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 992 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Va. 1997), afid, 159
F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 199 S. Ct. 1252 (1999).
268 See id. at 829.
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context of juvenile rights jurisprudence.2 69 The court described nu-
merous situations in which juveniles have limited rights, including
compulsory school attendance, the driving privilege, and limitations
on certain types of employment.270 Recognizing that juveniles' rights
are not coextensive with those of adults, the majority concluded that
intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard.271
In support of the first prong of the intermediate scrutiny stan-
dard, the important governmental interest, the city called a criminolo-
gist expert in juvenile curfews who testified that Charlottesville crime
rates paralleled national increases in juvenile crime.2 72 As is often the
case when courts adjudicate curfew challenges, the city easily satisfied
the first prong.2 73 With regard to the second prong, the substantial
relation requirement, the court agreed "that the curfew must be
shown to be a meaningful step towards solving a real, not fanciful
problem."274 Nevertheless, the standard "has never required scientific
or statistical 'proof' of the wisdom of the legislature's chosen
course."275 The court rejected the argument that the curfew was im-
permissibly underinclusive for failing to include seventeen-year-old
juveniles within the curfew regulation.2 76 In response to the plaintiffs'
charge that the curfew failed to include a group responsible for one
third of all juvenile crimes nationwide, the city proffered local statis-
tics showing that juveniles aged ten to sixteen were responsible for
eighty to eighty-five percent of local criminal arrests in 1995 and
1996.277 Thus, the local statistics tended to refute the contention that
the curfew was underinclusive. Ultimately, the majority viewed the ex-
clusion of seventeen-year olds as an appropriate exercise of legislative
judgment.2 78
The Fourth Circuit majority ultimately upheld the curfew under
intermediate scrutiny, but stated that the curfew would have survived
even strict scrutiny.279 The court noted that the curfew ordinance was
"the least restrictive means to advance Charlottesville's compelling in-
269 See id. at 847 ("Minors enjoy some rights under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments before they attain adulthood. At the same time, the Supreme Court has made abun-
dandy clear that children's rights are not coextensive with those of adults." (citations
omitted)); see also supra notes 125-37 and accompanying text (discussing minors' rights).
270 See Schlifer, 992 F. Supp. at 847.
271 See id.
272 See id. at 848.
273 See id. at 848-49.
274 Id. at 849.
275 Id. (citation omitted).
276 See id. at 849-50.
277 See id. at 850 ("[T]he City's decision to exclude seventeen-year-olds from coverage
under the curfew is a legislative judgment that we are loath to second-guess.").
278 See id.
279 See id. at 851.
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terests." 280 Indeed, the majority credited the district court's assess-
ment that Charlottesville's curfew appeared to be "among the most
modest and lenient of the myriad curfew laws implemented nation-
wide."281 While the assessment that the curfew is among the most rea-
sonable nationwide has some support, Part V.B of this Note will
challenge the conclusion that it is the least restrictive means to ad-
vance the city's interests.
Judge Michael dissented, arguing that the curfew should have
been struck down under strict scrutiny.28 2 Recognizing that age is not
a suspect classification, Judge Michael argued that the age classifica-
tion affected fundamental constitutional rights and thus triggered
strict scrutiny.28 3
In applying this standard, Judge Michael conceded that the City
has a compelling interest in preventing crime, but argued that the
Charlottesville curfew was not narrowly tailored, because it "treat[ed]
all minors the same even though an exceedingly small percentage
commit crimes." 28 4 With regard to the city's second objective of pro-
moting the safety and well-being of juveniles, Judge Michael deter-
mined that the curfew did not serve a compelling governmental
interest, because it attempts to achieve its purpose by "displacing pa-
rental authority over the upbringing of children."28 5 Furthermore, he
noted that the majority stated only that the city has a "strong" interest
in this objective, and that "strong" interests are not "compelling."28 6
Judge Michael also found that the ordinance's third stated purpose,
fostering parental responsibility, also did not support a compelling
state interest because the curfew displaces parental authority.287 Fi-
280 Id. at 852.
281 Id at 855 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although not explicitly mentioned
in the majority opinion, one could speculate that the existence of a sunset provision con-
tributed to the modest and lenient nature of the curfew. See CHaLOTrESWLL=, VA., CrnY
CODE § 17-7-2 (1996), which states:
2. Within one year after the effective date of March 1, 1997 of this ordi-
nance, the City Manager shall review this ordinance and report and make
recommendations to the City Council concerning the effectiveness of and
the continuing need for the ordinance. The City Manager's report shall
specifically include the following information: (a) the practicality of enforc-
ing the ordinance and any problems with enforcement identified by the
Police Department; (b) the impact and cost of the ordinance; (c) other
data and information which the Police Department believes to be relevant
in assessing the effectiveness of the curfew ordinance; and (d) information
from citizens regarding whether the ordinance has been administered and
enforced fairly, including information regarding the age, gender and race
of those charged or detained under the ordinance.
282 See id at 858 (Michael, J., dissenting).
283 See id. at 859-60 (Michael, J., dissenting).
284 Id. at 866 (Michael, J., dissenting).
285 Id at 867-68 (Michael, J., dissenting).
286 Id. at 867 (Michael, J., dissenting).
287 See id. at 868 (Michael, J., dissenting).
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nally, Judge Michael argued that even if the curfew passed strict scru-
tiny, it would nevertheless be unconstitutional because the First
Amendment "exception" was impermissibly vague.2 8 8 Consequently,
Judge Michael concluded that the majority decision "relegates kids to
second-class citizenship" by allowing infringement of their fundamen-
tal rights. 28 9
IV
RECONCILING CONFLICTING STANDARDS iN ADJUDICATING
JUVENILE CURFEW CHALLENGES
Nunez, Hutchins, and Schleifer illustrate the pronounced split in
federal authority haunting the adjudication of juvenile curfews. In
view of these recent cases, the analysis leads back to square one-de-
termining the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny. The courts
must first articulate the level of scrutiny before it applies the standard.
In some circumstances, however, analysis of the courts' application of
the standard is a better reflection of the actual scrutiny involved than
the one it articulates. This next Part summarizes the standards articu-
lated by judges deciding curfew challenges and then analyzes the ap-
plication of those standards in an attempt to clarify which standard
judges actually implement. Several questions arise in the context of
this analysis: Why were the curfews in the examined cases accorded
their various treatments? Were the curfews much different in scope
or exceptions? What effect do differing circumstances, in terms of
crime rates and statistics, have on the vitality ofjuvenile curfews? This
Note endeavors to reconcile the conflicting decisions by addressing
these and other questions.
A. Determining the Appropriate Level of Constitutional Scrutiny
1. Articulating the Standard
Of the federal cases that have adjudicated juvenile curfews under
one of the three standards of scrutiny, ten federal judges have articu-
lated strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard, ten have chosen inter-
mediate scrutiny, and six have chosen rational review. 290
288 See id (Michael, J., dissenting).
289 Id. at 858 (Michael, J., dissenting).
290 These numbers are gleaned from the federal district court and circuit court opin-
ions that have utilized one of the three standards of review in adjudicating curfew chal-
lenges. These numbers do not distinguish between heightened review triggered under
due process and heightened review triggered under equal protection. For a discussion of
the doctrinal sources of the different standards of review, see infra Part VA. Decisions
adjudicated solely on other grounds, such as overbreadth or jurisdictional defects, are ex-
cluded. Hence, the district court opinion in Johnson v. City of Opelousas is included, whereas
the circuit court decision in the same case, which was expressly limited to overbreadth, is
not. Similarly, Naprstek v. City of Norwich and McCollester v. Keene are also excluded. No
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Consequently, the cases exhibit a clear judicial preference for some
form of heightened review.
The judges who have chosen rational review are the following:
(1) ChiefJudge Sheridan, district court judge in Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown;291 (2) Judge Shaw, district court judge in Johnson v. City of
Opelousa, 292 and (3) Judge Silberman, writing for the plurality in the
en banc rehearing of Hutchins v. District of Columbia, joined by Judges
Williams, Sentelle, and Randolph. 293 One possible explanation for
the application of rational review hinges on the impact of Bellotti.294
Because Bykofsky predated Bellotti by three years, the Bykofsky court de-
cided its case without the benefit of Bellotti. Hence, one could argue
that Bykofsky would be analyzed differently today.
The argument rejecting rational review based on this chronology
of events is at least indirectly supported by the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania's recent decision in Gaffney v. City of Allentown.29 5 In
Gaffney, the court applied the Bellotti criteria and found that dimin-
ished scrutiny was notjustified.2 96 The Gaffney court declined to fol-
low Bykofsky and invalidated a juvenile curfew law under strict
scrutiny.2 97 Despite the clear rejection of Bykofsky's import, Gaffney is
an unreported case, so the extent of its significance is questionable.
Arguably, it is the first step in Bykofsky's erosion within the Third Cir-
cuit. The other two cases involving rational review ignored the appar-
ent significance of Bellotti; neither the majority opinion in Johnson nor
part II of Judge Silberman's plurality decision in Hutchins makes any
mention of it.298
A more plausible explanation for the application of rational re-
view stems from the analysis of fundamental rights. Each of the
judges choosing rational review has found that the challenged juve-
appeals were taken in Gaffiney v. City of Allentown or Waters v. Barry. See supra Part I.B.2.
Only two judges from Qutb were included, because one judge concurred only in the judg-
ment, without expressing an opinion on the manner in which the decision was made. See
Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 496 (5th Cir. 1993).
291 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1245 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (un-
published table decision).
292 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981).
293 188 F.3d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc).
294 See supra Part l.A.
295 1997 WL 597989 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1997).
296 See id. at *4-5.
297 The court stated:
In light of the paucity of support for the City's argument that the curfew
protects minors, and the inability of the City to show that the curfew pro-
tects the rest of society by significantly reducing crimes committed by mi-
nors, this court must hold that the curfew does not meet strict scrutiny.
See id, at *8.
298 See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 536-41 (plurality opinion); Johnson v. City of Opelousas,
488 F. Supp. 433, 434 (W.D. La. 1980), rev', 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981).
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nile curfew does not infringe upon any fundamental rights.299 These
findings were based on the fact that curfew exceptions were made for
explicitly recognized fundamental rights-interstate travel and First
Amendment activity30 0-and that any other rights allegedly impli-
cated were not "fundamental."301 Most courts have characterized the
issue as whether the curfew restricts a juvenile's right to freedom of
movement or intrastate travel,302 though a division of authority exists
as to whether this right is fundamental.303 Conversely, a minority of
judges have characterized the issue as whether "juveniles have a funda-
mental right to be on the streets at night without adult supervi-
sion."3 0 4 Predictably, the judges adopting this characterization have
concluded that no such fundamental right exists.305 This Note agrees
with the former approach, noting that the latter characterization
"needlessly entangles equal protection and due process analysis by de-
fining a fundamental right with reference to the class of people assert-
ing it."306 Putting aside for the moment the issue of proper
characterization, Part V.A of this Note challenges the conclusion that
heightened review is not warranted simply because the alleged right
restricted by a juvenile curfew is not deemed fundamental.30 7
The decisions that articulated strict scrutiny as the appropriate
standard contain several textual references indicating some decrease
in the standard of review. In Nunez, for example, the Ninth Circuit
299 See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 538 (Silberman, J.) (plurality opinion); Johnson, 488 F.
Supp. at 440; Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1265 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
300 For a discussion of the fundamental rights exceptions, see infra Part IV.B.
301 Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 538 (Silberman, J.) (plurality opinion); Johnson, 488 F. Supp.
at 440; Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1265.
302 See, e.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 1997) (characteriz-
ing the right as one of"free movement"); Quth v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993)
(framing the issue as whether the curfew restricts the "right to move about freely"); Bykof-
sky, 401 F. Supp. at 1254, 1262 (characterizing the right as one of "freedom of movement"
and "intrastate travel"). Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit in Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvile
framed the issue more generally, finding that the curfew infringes upon minors' "constitu-
tional liberties." 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1252 (1999).
303 See, e.g., Nune, 114 F.3d at 944 ("Citizens have a fundamental right of free move-
ment.... ."); cf Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492 ("[W]e assume without deciding that the right to move
about freely is a fimdamental right."). But see Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1265 ("[Tihe curfew
ordinance does not impinge upon the exercise of 'fundamental' rights."). For noncurfew
cases deciding whether the right to intrastate travel is a fundamental right, see infra notes
378-80.
304 Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 538 (Silberman, J.) (plurality opinion). Four of the 11 sitting
judges on the D.C. Circuit's en banc panel adopted this characterization; Judges Williams,
Sentelle, and Randolph joined in Part 11 ofJudge Silberman's plurality opinion. See id. at
534.
305 See id. at 538.
306 Id. at 556 (RogersJ, concurring in part, dissenting in part). For a thorough objec-
tion to the narrow characterization of the allegedly infringed right, see Part I of Judge
Rogers' opinion, id. at 552-60.
307 See infra Part V.A.
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explicitly rejected intermediate scrutiny and chose to apply strict scru-
tiny.308 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit also conceded "that strict scru-
tiny in the context of minors may allow greater burdens on minors
than would be permissible on adults as a result of the unique interests
implicated in regulating minors." 0 9 Similarly, in Qutb, the Fifth Cir-
cuit noted that "under certain circumstances, minors may be treated
differently from adults."310 These textual references indicate judicial
cognizance of heightened scrutiny, yet subtly acknowledge differential
treatment on account of minority. The next section of this Note ar-
gues that even the courts that articulate strict scrutiny as the appropri-
ate standard actually utilize an approach more properly characterized
as intermediate scrutiny.
2. Examining the Applied Standard
a. Extent of the State Interest
Courts are in general agreement that states have a compelling
interest in reducing juvenile crime and victimization.8 1' As the
Supreme Court recognized in Schall v. Martin, "[t] he 'legitimate and
compelling state interest' in protecting the community from crime
cannot be doubted."312 This interest loses no validity simply from the
involvement of minors.8 18 Since the state interest involved is sufficient
to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard, then, a fortiori, it is sufficient for
intermediate scrutiny and rational review. Even courts adopting the
intermediate scrutiny standard concede that a state's interest in reduc-
ing juvenile crime and victimization is compelling. 14
808 In Nune, the Ninth Circuit held that strict scrutiny applied:
Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating minors dif-
ferently than adults, we do not believe that this lesser degree of scrutiny is
appropriate to review burdens on minors' fundamental rights. Thus, the
district court erred in stating that minors' "circumscribed" liberty interest
was not fundamental and could be subjected to intermediate scrutiny. The
district court nevertheless correctly decided to apply strict scrutiny, despite
its conclusion that a lower level of scrutiny was permissible.
Nunez, 114 F.3d at 946.
309 Id.
310 Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993).
311 See, e.g., Hutchins, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc); Schleifer v. City of
Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 849 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1252 (1999); Nunez,
114 F.3d at 946-47; Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492; Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1139 (D.D.C.
1989); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1976) ("Clearly, the protection of
public health and safety represents an important function of state and local
governments.").
312 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (upholding the constitutionality of a state statute that
authorized the pretrial detention of juveniles).
313 See id. at 264-65.
314 See Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 849 (conceding, for the sake of argument, that the state
interest is compelling).
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b. The Means-Ends Fit
In contrast to the general consensus concerning the first prong
of constitutional scrutiny, the second prong is more problematic. The
operative question of the second prong is the degree of correlation
between the means and ends. Recall that under strict scrutiny, a law
will pass constitutional muster only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.315 The Supreme Court has interpreted the
narrow-tailoring requirement to require that the regulation be neces-
sary and the least restrictive means of achieving the proffered ends.316
Under the intermediate scrutiny standard, a very close relationship
between means and ends is required to ensure that legislatures act "on
the basis of reasoned analysis rather than assumptions." 17
In examining juvenile curfews under both the intermediate and
strict scrutiny standards, the courts have identified several means-ends
defects caused by statistical gaps in proffered data.318 The following
subsections discuss alleged defects in time dimension and age classifi-
cations and argue that the actual degree of scrutiny applied in the
"strict scrutiny" cases is more consistent with intermediate scrutiny.
i. Defects in Means-Ends Fit: The Time Dimension
The time-dimension issue involves the relationship between the
time of day during which juvenile crime and victimization occur and
the operative hours ofjuvenile curfews. The problems implicated by
the time-dimension issue are best illustrated with an example. In one
315 See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
316 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237-38 (1995) (holding that
all racial classifications are subject to strict constitutional scrutiny, thereby overruling Metro
Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which had held that so called "benign" racial
classifications were subject only to intermediate scrutiny).
317 Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 144 F.3d 798, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Missis-
sippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-26 (1982), revd en banc, 188 F.3d 531
(D.C. Cir. 1999)). Writing for a 5-4 majority in Hogan, Justice O'Connor explicated on the
contours of the "substantial relation" requirement:
If the State's objective is legitimate and important, we next determine
whether the requisite direct, substantial relationship between objective and
means is present. The purpose of requiring that close relationship is to
assure that the validity of a classification is determined through reasoned
analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional,
often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women.
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725-26 (footnote omitted).
318 Other alleged statistical defects have been identified in addition to the time dimen-
sion and age classification. For example, in Hutchins, the plaintiffs alleged that the district
failed to provide data to show where juvenile crimes and victimizations occurred (i.e., at
home or in public). See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 542. Arguably, if mostjuvenile victimizations
occur inside the home, then a curfew may be ineffectual in meeting the city's objective of
reducing juvenile victimizations. In response, however, a plurality of the D.C. Circuit
found that the fact "[t]hat a substantial percentage of violent juvenile victimizations (ap-
proximately 33%) occurred on the streets adequately supports the relationship between
the government's interest and the imposition of the curfew." Id. at 544.
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commentary supporting charitable judicial treatment of juvenile cur-
fews, the author tells a tragic story of a fourteen-year-old straight-A
student who, as an innocent bystander, was gunned down by youth
gang violence in Chicago.319 The author concedes, however, that the
incident actually occurred at 8:39 P.M., clearly outside the scope of
any curfew statute.3 20 Consequently, statistics illustrating hourly
breakdowns for juvenile crime serve important informational needs to
assess the efficacy of curfew regulations.3 21
Judicial response to the time-dimension gap has varied. In Qutb
v. Strauss,322 for example, the Fifth Circuit purported to apply strict
scrutiny. However, in response to arguments about the statistical de-
fects, the Fifth Circuit tersely noted:
Although the city was unable to provide precise data concerning the
number of juveniles who commit crimes during the curfew hours,
or the number of juvenile victims of crimes committed during the
curfew, the city nonetheless provided sufficient data to demonstrate
that the classification created by the ordinance "fits" the state's com-
pelling interest.3 23
Indeed, as one commentator who applauded the Qutb decision
conceded, the actual scrutiny applied by the court was somewhat
319 See Siebert, supra note 29, at 1711.
320 See id. at 1711 n.1.
321 Even jurisdictions that have enacted juvenile curfews recognize the importance of
time-specific and age-related statistics. For example, the curfew ordinance invalidated in
Waters v. Bary, 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989), contained a review process provision,
which mandated the use of specific statistics to gauge the efficacy of the curfew. The provi-
sion read in pertinent part:
§ 5. Review Process.
(a) Five days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, holidays and days of Council
recess, prior to the expiration of this act, the Mayor shall report to the
Council on the curfew's effectiveness and shall recommend that the
curfew for minors either be continued or discontinued.
(b) Criteria by which effectiveness shall be measured include monthly sta-
tistics, by ward and police precinct, on:
(1) The number of minors detained and the number of persons fined
as a result of a violation of this act;
(2) The number of criminal homicides and other narcotic trafficking
related crimes of violence committed during the time that this act is
in effect, by age and time of day, and
(3) The number of minors injured during the curfew hours as a result of
crime and the cause of each injury.
Id. at 1142 app. A (quoting District of Columbia, Temporary Curfew Emergency Act of
1989, No. 8-325 (Apr. 14, 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
The court held the ordinance unconstitutional, noting that, "[in 1988, of the 26
juveniles killed... not one was clearly killed at a time or place that he or she would not
have been had the curfew been in effect" and that "[p]recisely half of these killings oc-
curred in the juvenile's home." Id. at 1139.
322 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993).
323 Id. at 493 (footnote omitted).
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"charitable and cursory." 24 Although the Qutb court dearly exhibited
a preference for heightened review, the court's willingness to over-
look the state's inability to substantiate the efficacy of the curfew un-
dermines the usual rigor of strict scrutiny. Furthermore, the court's
outright dismissal of statistics, which tended to cut against the consti-
tutionality ofjuvenile curfews, also undermined the court's purported
application of strict scrutiny.
The court in Nunez v. City of San Diego similarly overlooked imper-
fect statistical information in purportedly applying strict scrutiny.325
In Nunez, the City of San Diego offered a Justice Department report
showing that nationwide, juvenile crime peaks at around 3:00 P.M.
and again around 6:00 P.M.3 26 The court noted the general relevance
of such statistics, but held that national statistics are not sufficiently
probative of the local situation.327 However, San Diego also offered
local statistics detailing juvenile crime and victimization rates.328 The
city's 1995 report showed that juvenile victimization actually increased
during curfew hours in the year after curfew enforcement began and
that "only 15% of arrests for violent juvenile crimes occurred during
curfew hours."329 The city's 1996 report was somewhat more support-
ive of its case, showing a slight drop-off in juvenile victimization, cou-
pled with increased juvenile violent crime arrests during curfew
hours.330 Despite these defects, the Ninth Circuit refused to invali-
date the curfew "based on the argument that a curfew is not particu-
larly effective at meeting the City's interest."33' While rejecting the
city's justification that the curfew had a beneficial "deterrent effect,"
the court nevertheless concluded that the city established "some
nexus" between means and ends.33 2 As the "some nexus" language
itself suggests, the standard the court applied was indeed a height-
ened one, though it seemingly falls short of a true strict-scrutiny stan-
dard. Hence, the analyses in Qutb and Nunez support the view that the
level of scrutiny applied by the courts was somewhat less than "strict."
324 Sieber, supra note 29, at 1734-35. The author also argues that juvenile curfew laws,
such as those upheld in Qutb, will help fight juvenile crime. He proposes a few changes
that he thinks would help insulate a Qutb-type curfew from constitutional infirmity.
325 See Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 1997).
326 See id. at 947 (referring to national statistics gathered by the Justice Department).
327 See id. ("We accept the relevancy of the national crime statistics regarding the gen-
eral increase of dangers to minors and others, but the national statistics do not conclusively
show that the nocturnal juvenile curfew is a narrowly tailored solution.").
328 See id.
329 Id.
330 The statistical information cited in the case refers to the first quarter of 1995 to
1996, rather than the year end results. See id.
331 Id. at 948 ("We will not dismiss the City's legislative conclusion that the curfew will
have a salutary effect on juvenile crime and victimization.").
332 Id.
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The circuit judges applying intermediate scrutiny have been
equally rigorous, if not more, than those judges purporting to apply
strict scrutiny. Take for example Hutchins v. District of Columbia, Ini-
tially, Judge Rogers's opinion found that the District of Columbia's
proffered statistics were insufficient to sustain the intermediate scru-
tiny standard.3 33 There, the evidence establishing the time of day of
juvenile offenses was contradicted by other evidence and was flawed
because it included statistics on seventeen-year olds, who were outside
the scope of D.C.'s curfew.3 3 4 Because the evidentiary defects went to
the very "fundamental features of the curfew-the age of those cov-
ered and the hours of coverage"-the curfew could not pass interme-
diate scrutiny.335
Upon the rehearing en banc, however, a plurality of the D.C. Cir-
cuit held that the District had in fact established that it had met the
intermediate scrutiny standard by demonstrating its problem with ju-
venile crime and victimization during curfew hours.33 6 The court
pointed to evidence indicating that over fifty percent of juvenile ar-
rests took place during curfew hours.3 37 There was some debate as to
the accuracy of the data that the D.C. Council presented on this point,
but the court dismissed any discrepancies as "minor."338 Further-
more, the court held that because serious crimes among all age
groups were more likely to occur during curfew hours, this evidence
substantiated the fit between the curfew and the city's objectives.3 39
In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, in which intermediate scrutiny
was applied, the plaintiffs relied on ajustice Department report which
asserted that seventeen percent of juvenile crime occurs during cur-
few hours, while the peak of twenty-two percent occurs between 2:00
P.M. and 6:00 P.M. on school days.340 The City of Charlottesville re-
sponded by questioning the underlying assumptions of the study, ar-
guing that the statistics in that study were probably skewed because
several of the cities in the control group already had curfews in ef-
fect;3 4 1 in other words, Charlottesville argued that curfews were re-
sponsible for the lower nighttime rates in the other cities.
Charlottesville rebutted this study by submitting the testimony of city
police officers confirming that most serious juvenile crimes occur dur-
333 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 144 F.3d 798, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rev'd en
banc, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
334 See id. at 814.
335 Id. at 815.
336 See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 543-44 (en banc) (plurality opinion).
337 See id.
338 Id. at 543.
339 See id. at 544.
340 See Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 850 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 1252 (1999).
341 See id.
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ing curfew hours.342 Further, Charlottesville showed a thirty-eight per-
cent increase in juvenile offenses between 11:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M.3 43
Even though the city's curfew commences at 12:01 A.M. on weekdays
and 1:00 A.M. on weekends, the Fourth Circuit did not find the argu-
ments regarding the time-dimension defects persuasive. 3 " Instead,
the court held that "[t]he Constitution certainly does not put legisla-
tures to the choice of solving the entirety of a social problem or no
part of it at all. 345 The curfew passed constitutional muster because
the court found it was a "meaningful step towards solving a real, not
fanciful problem."346
ii. Defects in Means-Ends Fit: The Age Correlation
Statistical problems related to age classifications bear on the effi-
cacy of juvenile curfews. Arguably, if seventeen-year-old minors unaf-
fected by the curfew commit most juvenile crimes, then this would
undermine the underlying rationale for juvenile curfew statutes. Na-
tional statistics reveal that seventeen-year olds are responsible for
more juvenile crime than their younger counterparts. 347 Neverthe-
less, the judicial responses to this defect have been as varied as the
responses to defects in the time dimension. For example, the statistics
proffered by the District of Columbia in Hutchins failed to distinguish
between seventeen-year-old minors, who are not subject to the curfew,
and those under seventeen who are subject to the curfew.348 Simi-
larly, the District's evidence supporting the curfew's effectiveness in
reducing juvenile victimization included youths aged fifteen through
nineteen.349 Initially, the court found these defective statistics to be
insufficient to withstand intermediate scrutiny: "As the annual reports
of the D.C. courts show, youths aged seventeen and older were re-
sponsible for 42% of juvenile referrals for the years 1990 through
1994; a curfew excluding this group lacks a close fit to the goal of
reducing juvenile crime." 350 Furthermore, since the statistics failed to
point out what percentage of youths the curfew does not affect (those
between seventeen and nineteen), they offered "only weak evidence
that the curfew will much reduce the teen violent death rate."351
342 See id.
343 See id.
344 See id.
345 Id. at 851 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
346 Id. at 849.
347 See 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE, supra note 44, at 12.
348 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 144 F.Sd 798, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rev'd en
banc, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
349 See id.
350 Id. (footnotes omitted).
351 Id.
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Upon rehearing en banc, a plurality of the D.C. Circuit held that
these alleged defects did not render the fit between the curfew and
the goal unconstitutional.3 52 The court noted that the District
presented "more data showing that arrests for youths under [seven-
teen] have been increasing steadily. ' 353 Furthermore, even if seven-
teen-year olds were more likely to commit crimes than their younger
counterparts, the court noted that the "District can hardly be faulted
for determining not to include [seventeen-year] olds in the cur-
few."3 5 4 In other words, the court would not blame the city for being
less intrusive than it could have been.3 55 In Qutb, by comparison, the
Fifth Circuit did not address the statistical defects explicitly, but in-
stead found that precise data was not necessary to withstand strict
scrutiny.3 56
The plaintiffs in Schleifer advanced a similar age-correlation argu-
ment.3 7 The plaintiffs argued that the ordinance was not substan-
tially related to its objective because it excluded seventeen-year olds
from curfew regulation, even though seventeen-year olds committed
one third of all juvenile crimes nationwide.3 58 In response, Char-
lottesville advanced specific evidence showing that eighty to eighty-five
percent of local juvenile arrests for serious crimes were within the ten-
to sixteen-year-old age group.3 59 The court therefore declined to in-
validate the curfew based on the argument that it was impermissibly
underinclusive.3 60 This information was apparently sufficient to rebut
the inference that the curfew was ineffective. 361
The Nunez case did not address this statistical gap because San
Diego's curfew applied to everyone under the age of eighteen.3 62 As
352 See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 542-45.
353 Id. at 543.
354 Id.
355 See id.
356 See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 493 (5th Cir. 1993); supra notes 115-17 and accom-
panying text.
357 See Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 849-50 (4th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 1252 (1999).
358 See id.
359 See id. at 850-51. Charlottesville also presented evidence that certain crimes were
more likely to occur during curfew hours:
The record documents that in Charlottesville in 1996 aggravated assaults
were almost one and one-half times as likely to occur during curfew hours
as non-curfew hours, robberies more than twice as likely to occur at these
times, forcible rapes more than three times as likely during curfew hours,
and incidents of drunk driving more than five times more likely to occur
during curfew hours, trends that continued into the first months of 1997.
Id. at 351.
360 See id. at 850 ("[T]he City's decision to exclude seventeen-year-olds from coverage
under the curfew is a legislative judgment that we are loath to second-guess.").
361 See id.
362 See Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 1997).
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noted earlier, however, the court found "some nexus" existed between
the curfew and its stated objective despite statistical gaps relating to
the time dimension.3 63 This language suggests that the Ninth Circuit
would probably have overlooked similar age correlation defects in the
proffered statistics.
Analysis of the applied standards in these cases reveals an interest-
ing fact: The curfew justifications presented in Schleifer and Hutchins
appear to be as strong, if not stronger, than those in the Qutb and
Nunez cases. However, the Schleifer and Hutchins courts accorded more
stringent treatment after elucidating a less stringent standard. In
other words, the strict scrutiny standard in Qutb and Nunez apparently
was somewhat diminished. More specifically, the applied standard in
Qutb and Nunez comports with the contours of intermediate scrutiny
as applied in Schleifer and Hutchins.3 64
In addition to questions of application, other issues are relevant
in determining the judicial treatment juvenile curfew challenges will
receive. The next section discusses curfew exceptions, or lack thereof,
and their bearing on the validity ofjuvenile curfews.
B. Curfew Drafting: Ensuring Sufficient Exceptions Without
"Swallowing the Rule"
Curfew drafters are faced with a dilemma: Insufficient exceptions
render an ordinance susceptible to constitutional attack, whereas too
many exceptions create the danger that the exceptions will swallow
the rule.365 The first type of danger is manifest in Nunez.3 66 The
Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that San Diego's "failure to provide ade-
quate exceptions not only excessively burdens minors' right to free
movement, but it also excessively burdens their right to free
speech."36 7 Case law has sufficiently addressed the issue of too few
exceptions by virtue of the overbreadth doctrine. 368 This section fo-
cuses on the latter half of the dilemma.369
363 See id. at 948.
364 For a discussion on the application of intermediate scrutiny, see infra Part V.C.
365 Cf Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 853 ("If [city] councils draft an ordinance with exceptions,
those exceptions are subject to a vagueness challenge. If they neglect to provide excep-
tions, then the ordinance is attacked for not adequately protecting First Amendment
freedoms.").
366 See Nune, 114 F.3d at 948.
367 Id. at 949.
368 For a discussion of earlier cases defining the parameters of overbreadth challenges,
see supra Part I.B.2.
369 This Part intends to survey the varied exceptions to juvenile curfews, rather than to
fully analyze their implications. To reach the merits of a given case under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, this Note assumes that a challenged curfew provides adequate and clear
exceptions, particularly for fundamental rights, to withstand vagueness and overbreadth
challenges. See supra Part I.B.2.
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The ordinance at issue in Qutb, with its numerous exceptions, is
theoretically susceptible to the second type of danger.370 An analysis
of the different types of exceptions typically drafted into to curfew
regulations is a helpful analytical tool. The Qutb curfew is particularly
instructive in this regard.371 The exceptions in Qutb can be divided
into three categories: (1) legal guardianship/supervision; (2) pruden-
tial/practical exceptions; and (3) fundamental rights:
Legal Guardianship/ Prudential/Practical
Supervision Exceptions Fundamental Rights
- accompanied by - employment activity - First Amendment
guardian rights
- errand directed by - school/civic function - Interstate travel
guardian
- sidewalk of minor's - emergency situation
residence
- emancipated minor
As noted earlier, legislators enact juvenile curfews for three rea-
sons: (1) to reduce juvenile crime, (2) to reduce juvenile victimiza-
tion, and (3) to increase parental responsibility. 372 Legal
guardianship exceptions to the curfew are justified because the three
legislative policy rationales underlying the curfew are adequately ad-
dressed under these exceptions. For example, a child accompanied
by a guardian is presumably less likely to commit a crime or fall victim
to one. Further, such exceptions accommodate the rights of parents
to rear their children.373 Nevertheless, some enforcement problems
still surface, as illustrated by the guardian-directed-errand excep-
tion.374 In consideration of this exception, some municipalities have
adopted interesting approaches for enforcement, such as requiring
the minor to possess a note from the guardian describing the
errand.375
As the name suggests, practical considerations give rise to the ex-
ceptions in the prudential/practical category.376 Surely a genuine
emergency justifies an exception to curfew regulation. Similarly, in
the case of a municipally sponsored event, the city should not en-
370 See supra notes 103-20 and accompanying text.
371 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
372 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
373 See Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 853 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied
119 S. Ct. 1252 (1999) ("The limited curtailment ofjuvenile liberty in the ordinance vio-
lates neither a minor's nor a parent's rights.").
374 See Juvenile Curfew Ordinances, supra note 22, at 145 ("[A] broad exception for pa-
rental errands might open an excessively large loophole.").
375 See Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 857.
376 SeeJuvenile Curfew Ordinances, supra note 22, at 144 ("Other exceptions are generally
made for children involved in what the legislature determines to be legitimate, innocent
activities.").
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courage attendance and then punish juveniles for violating the cur-
few. In addition, exceptions for certain legitimate activities, such as
travel to and from employment, help to ensure a curfew's political
viability.
Exceptions for fundamental rights would appear to settle any
questions regarding the curfew's constitutional infirmity. If activities
protected by fundamental rights lie outside of curfew enforcement,
the regulation cannot infringe on such rights.377 Nevertheless, simply
drafting a defense into the curfew is not a wholly satisfactory response.
Creating an exception for certain fundamental rights raises several
questions regarding the parameters of those rights and whether there
should be exceptions for other rights. For example, creating an ex-
ception for interstate travel raises the issue of whether to create a simi-
lar exception for intrastate travel. Further, an exception for First
Amendment activity simply begs the question of exactly what type of
activity the First Amendment protects. Drafting an exception for First
Amendment activity and interstate travel supports the inference that
these rights are sufficiently important to warrant protection, even for
minors. The following sections discuss the implications for drafting
exceptions for First Amendment rights and interstate travel.
1. Fundamental Rights: Interstate v. Intrastate Right to Travel
The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that the Constitution
guarantees the fundamental right to interstate travel.378 The Court,
however, has never explicitly recognized the right to intrastate travel
as a fundamental right.379 The circuit courts are split with regard to
whether a fundamental right to intrastate travel exists. 38 0 Serious
377 See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1261 (M.D. Pa. 1975),
afTd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (unpublished table decision) (noting that the presence
of a properly structured exception makes it "apparent that the ordinance in no way in-
fringes on the right to interstate travel").
378 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (invalidating state residency
requirement that restricted the receipt of welfare assistance to those who had resided in
the jurisdiction for at least one year), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974).
379 SeeTownes v. City of St. Louis, 949 F. Supp. 731, 734-35 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (discussing
circuit split as to judicial recognition of a fundamental right to intrastate travel), af'd, 112
F.3d 514 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1255 (recognizing the importance
of the freedom of movement, but noting that "the liberty guaranteed by the due process
clause implies absence of arbitrary interferences but not immunity from reasonable regula-
tions" (citing Gere v. Stanley, 453 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1971), affg 320 F. Supp. 852 (M.D. Pa.
1970))).
380 Compare Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 258-62 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); King v.
New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 1971) (same), and Cole v.
Housing Auth., 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970) (recognizing fundamental right to intrastate
travel), withAndre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Millwood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977)
(same), Wardwell v. Board of Ed. of City Sch. Dist., 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976) (same),
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flaws, however, underlie any rationale that supports the distinction be-
tween interstate and intrastate travel.381
As a practical matter, distinguishing the right to movement on
the basis of intrastate versus interstate is unworkable; the right to in-
trastate travel is necessarily implicit in the right to interstate travel.382
Otherwise, one would have a fundamental right to travel across the
state border, but no fundamental right to travel to the state border.
Such reasoning poses the following syllogism: If intrastate travel de-
serves as much protection as interstate travel, and interstate travel is
exempted from the purview of the curfew, then intrastate travel must
be exempted as well.38 3 Consequently, exceptions for both interstate
and intrastate travel would swallow the proverbial rule.
Circuit courts that hold that the right to intrastate travel is a fun-
damental right should arguably be more hostile to juvenile curfews
than those courts which do not. Experience, however, has not proven
this assumption. For example, in Wright v. City of Jackson, the Fifth
Circuit declined to recognize intrastate travel as a fundamental
right.38 4 In Qutb, however, the same court analyzed a curfew under
strict scrutiny, operating on the assumption that the right to move
about freely was a fundamental right.3 8 5 Conversely, in Lutz v. City of
York, the Third Circuit explicitly recognized the fundamental right to
intrastate travel, including the right to localized movement.38 6 Yet the
circuit has not overruled Bykofsky, which exempts only interstate travel
and upheld the curfew under rational review. Interestingly, the Third
Circuit in Lutz held that restrictions on the fundamental right of intra-
state travel trigger intermediate scrutiny,387 thus indirectly supporting
the view that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate in examining juve-
nile curfews.388
and Wright v. City ofJackson, 506 F.2d 900, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1975) (declining to recognize
fundamental right to intrastate travel).
381 See generally Andrew C. Porter, Comment, Toward a Constitutional Analysis of the Right
to Intrastate Trave 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 820 (1992) (detailing right-to-travel jurisprudence and
concluding that courts should recognize a fundamental right to intrastate travel).
382 See King, 442 F.2d at 648 ("It would be meaningless to describe the right to travel
between states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a
correlative constitutional right to travel within a state.").
383 But see Duane W. Schroeder, Comment, The Right to Travek In Search of a Constitu-
tional Soure 55 NEB. L. REv. 117, 128-29 (1975) (arguing that the right to intrastate travel
is not fundamental and that restrictions should be adjudicated under rational review).
384 See 506 F.2d 900, 901-02 (5th Cir. 1975) (rejecting fireman's challenge to city's
residency requirement for municipal employees).
385 See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993).
386 See 899 F.2d 255, 268 (3d Cir. 1990).
387 See Townes v. City of St. Louis, 949 F. Supp. 731, 735 (E.D. Mo. 1996) ("[T]he
intermediate scrutiny test espoused in Lutz is the proper standard for determining the
constitutionality of Ordinance 63038." (citation omitted)).
388 See infra Part V.
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2. Fundamental Rights: The First Amendment Exception
The lack of an exception for First Amendment activity will ordina-
rily invalidate a juvenile curfew.389 Curfew defects of this sort have
been traditionally dealt with under the overbreadth doctrine, as illus-
trated in Johnson v. City of Opelousas.390 Conversely, the inclusion of an
exception has often given rise to the claim that it makes the curfew
unconstitutionally vague.391 The argument has been made that the
First Amendment defense would require juveniles to be "'constitu-
tional scholars' to know what activities were forbidden."392 Further-
more, police officers untrained in the intricacies of the First
Amendment, in their unguided discretion, [would] enforce the cur-
few unconstitutionally."393 A strong counter-argument, however,
maintains that the exception "is no more vague than the First Amend-
ment itself."394 In other words, any difficulties in understanding the
exception are caused by the contours of First Amendment jurispru-
dence; the exception ensures that protected activities remain
protected.
Another analytical possibility exists, though it has been for the
most part unsuccessful. When the curfew lacks an exception for First
Amendment activity, the court may try to couch the curfew in terms of
a valid time, place, and manner restriction.395 The district court pro-
ceedings in Nunez illustrate this argument.396 The three requirements
for a valid time, place, and manner restriction are: (1) content neu-
trality; (2) narrow tailoring that serves a significant governmental in-
terest; and (3) sufficient alternative channels for communication.3 97
Juvenile curfews satisfy the first prong, because they do not distinguish
on the basis of content; rather, they restrict across the board.3 98 Cur-
fews arguably satisfy the third prong as well because sufficient oppor-
tunity for movement is available during noncurfew hours.3 99 The
narrow-tailoring requirement will generally invalidate a curfew that
389 See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text and Part III.B.
390 658 F.2d 1065, 1072 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (striking down curfew on over-
breadth grounds).
391 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
392 Id.
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
396 See Nunez v. City of San Diego, 963 F. Supp. 913, 920 (S.D. Cal. 1995).
397 See Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
398 See Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 951 (9th Cir. 1997) ("It is undisputed
that the regulation is content neutral.").
399 In Nunez, the Ninth Circuit found that the curfew was not a valid time, place, and
manner restriction because it failed the narrow-tailoring requirement. Thus, the court did
"not reach the question of whether the ordinance leaves open adequate alternative chan-
nels of expression." Id. at 951.
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makes no exception for First Amendment activity.40 0 Because curfews
face a similar analysis under this doctrine as they do under other con-
stitutional doctrines, such as equal protection, drafters should include
a First Amendment exception to protect against constitutional
attacks. 401
Simply incorporating a First Amendment exception into a cur-
few, however, does not necessarily foreclose all First Amendment is-
sues. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has recognized the right
to expressive association, which includes assembly for nonpolitical
purposes, including social, legal, and economic reasons.402 On the
other hand, the Court has declined to recognize a "generalized right
of 'social association.' 40 3 Determining whether associational rights
protect certain prohibited activities involves an extended inquiry into
First Amendment doctrine,40 4 which is beyond the scope of this Note.
V
PROPOSED SOLUTION: APPLICATION OF
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
The preceding Parts have described the historical development
of juvenile curfews, discussed the current split in federal authority,
and sought to reconcile the conflicting decisions. After advocating
intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard, this Note returns to
the question of its application. As illustrated in Qutb, however, mere
articulation of a standard of review does not always accurately reflect
the level of scrutiny actually applied.40 5 Hence, the practical applica-
tion must also be examined. First, this Part discusses several objec-
tions to the application of the intermediate scrutiny standard, as well
as the doctrinal sources for the standard. Second, this Part identifies
400 Se id.
401 The Supreme Court has held that the narrow-tailoring requirement of time, place,
and manner restrictions need not be the least restrictive means of achieving its goal. See
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797-98 (1989). Rather, the Court has required
that the means were not "substantially broader than necessary" to achieve its interest. Id. at
801 (citation omitted).
402 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (striking down state law that
prohibited the use of contraception by married couples as a violation of the constitutional
right to privacy).
403 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (upholding, under rational review,
the constitutionality of a city ordinance that limited the use of certain dance halls to per-
sons between the ages of 14 and 18). But see Reena Raggi, An Independent Right to Freedom of
Association, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 11-14 (1977) (arguing for the recognition of an
independent right to freedom of association).
404 For a discussion of this issue, see Jonathan D. Varat, When May Government Prefer One
Source of Private Expression over Another?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1645 (1998). See also Hananel,
supra note 22, at 317-18 ("It remains to be seen whether the exception for all minors exer-
cising First Amendment rights creates a gaping hole in the ordinance that actually encom-
passes all the activity the ordinance is designed to prohibit.").
405 See supra Part IV.
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sources ofjuvenile crime and discusses alternative measures that cities
can use which may be more effective and efficient than generalized
juvenile curfews. Finally, this Part argues that application of the inter-
mediate scrutiny standard is fair, workable, and consistent with the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on juvenile rights. It also discusses
the baseline offers of proof necessary to satisfy the intermediate scru-
tiny standard. Rather than establishing a bright-line rule for how well
curfews must work in order to pass constitutional scrutiny, the pur-
pose here is to ensure that curfews have some measure of efficacy in
reducing juvenile crime and victimization before they are upheld.
A. Countering Objections to the Application of Intermediate
Scrutiny
In contrast to strict scrutiny or rational review, "intermediate
scrutiny requires the Court to weigh conflicting rights and interests
and does not predetermine the outcome of the case." 4°6 In response,
critics of the intermediate scrutiny standard claim it is too indetermi-
nate, giving too much "legislative" power to the courts.4° 7 Indeed,
one Supreme Court Justice characterized the standard as "so diapha-
nous and elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences or
prejudices relating to particular types of legislation."40 s Nevertheless,
the intermediate scrutiny standard offers courts the ability to examine
juvenile curfews by carefully weighing the rights of juveniles against
the interests of the state.40 9 Intermediate scrutiny ensures a good
means-ends fit sought by legislatures without unduly inhibiting their
efforts to reduce juvenile crime. In Schleifer, Chief Judge Wilkinson
406 Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalim,
66 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 298, 300 (1998) (advocating expansion of the intermediate scrutiny
standard, but only in limited circumstances); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-LiberalJudg-
ing: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 293, 298 (1992) ("Where
intermediate scrutiny governs, the outcome is no longer foreordained at the threshold.").
See generally, Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a NewerEqual Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rxv. 1, 1-20 (1972) (identifying the evolution
of intermediate scrutiny within the framework of equal protection). Professor Gunther
characterized strict scrutiny as being "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Id. at 8. But see
Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 495 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholdingjuvenile curfew while purport-
ing to apply strict scrutiny).
407 Sullivan, supra note 406, at 301 ("[Intermediate scrutiny] makes the Court more
vulnerable to the charge of 'legislating from the bench.'"); Note, A Madisonian Interpreta-
tion of the Equal Protection Doctrine, 91 YALE LJ. 1403, 1412 (1982) (noting that intermediate
scrutiny gives courts "relatively little guidance in individual cases").
408 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
409 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) ("The unique role in our society of
the family... requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and flexibil-
ity to the special needs of parents and children." (citation omitted)); see also Shaman, supra
note 134, at 174 ("All constitutional adjudication, regardless of the structure through
which it is accomplished, necessarily entails a balancing or comparative evaluation of gov-
ernmental and individual interests.").
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eloquently argued why intermediate scrutiny is the most appropriate
standard of review:
In light of the case law, two things seem clear. First, children do
possess at least qualified rights, so an ordinance which restricts their
liberty to the extent that this one does should be subject to more
than rational basis review. Second, because children do not possess
the same rights as adults, the ordinance should be subject to less
than the strictest level of scrutiny. We thus believe intermediate
scrutiny to be the most appropriate level of review and must deter-
mine whether the ordinance is 'substantially related' to 'important'
governmental interests. 410
Given the Supreme Court's apparent unwillingness to expand the list
of fundamental rights,41' coupled with the admittedly important
rights at stake in juvenile curfew adjudication,412 the lower courts
should apply intermediate scrutiny when reviewing curfew challenges
because it is fair, workable, and consistent with Supreme Court
authority.
The Supreme Court articulated the intermediate scrutiny stan-
dard in Craig v. Boren413 in the context of a challenge to gender dis-
crimination.414 As applied to juvenile curfew challenges, its validity as
410 Schleiferv. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 1252 (1999) (citations omitted).
411 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986) ("There should be . .. great
resistance to expand the substantive reach of [due process], particularly if it requires rede-
fining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental.").
412 For example, see United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920), which states:
In all the States from the beginning down to the adoption of the Articles of
Confederation the citizens thereof possessed the fundamental right, inher-
ent in citizens of all free governments, peacefully to dwell within the limits
of their respective States, to move at will from place to place therein, and to
have free ingress thereto and egress therefrom ....
Id. at 293; see also supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the right to travel).
413 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (invalidating state statute that raised the drinking age for
males to 21 while keeping the drinking age for women at 18, despite statistical evidence
showing that males were more likely to drive while intoxicated).
414 In United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), the Supreme Court invalidated the
male-only admissions policy of the Virginia Military Institute under intermediate scrutiny,
holding that the state's rationale failed to provide an "exceedingly persuasive justification"
for the gender classification. Id. at 531. Since Virginia, there has been some debate about
whether the requirement of an "exceedingly persuasive justification" has heightened the
intermediate scrutiny standard for adjudicating gender discrimination claims. Language
in the Court's decision and certain other judicial opinions implies that intermediate scru-
tiny remains the appropriate standard. See, e.g., Engineering Contractors Ass'n v. Metro-
politan Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 907-08 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1186
(1998); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 183 (1st Cir. 1996). On the other hand, some
commentators argue that the level of scrutiny as applied now falls between intermediate
scrutiny and strict scrutiny. See, e.g.,Jeffrey A. Barnes, Casenote, The Supreme Court's "Exceed-
ingiy [Unipersuasive" Application of Intermediate Scrutiny in United States v. Virginia, 31 U.
RicH. L. REv. 523, 545-48 (1997); Christina Gleason, Comment, United States v. Virginia:
Skeptical Scrutiny and the Future of Gender Discrimination Law, 70 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 801, 812-
15 (1996); Jason M. Skaggs, Comment, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under
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a constitutional mechanism is not without its problems.415 From a
doctrinal standpoint, intermediate scrutiny developed under the aegis
of equal protection jurisprudence. 4 6 In contrast to equal protec-
tion's three tiers of review, the substantive due process framework has
traditionally been regarded as a two-tiered structure consisting of
strict scrutiny and rational review.417 Thus, challenges brought under
substantive due process do not have recourse to intermediate scrutiny
without arguably compromising doctrinal integrity.418 However, this
Note advocates the analysis ofjuvenile curfew challenges under equal
protection, rather than substantive due process. Professors Nowak
and Rotunda explain this position:
United States v. Virginia's "Exceedingly PersuasiveJustification"Standard, 86 CAL. L. REv. 1169,
1190-96 (1998). Still other commentators argue that Virginia subjects gender discrimina-
tion claims to a strict scrutiny analysis. See, e.g., Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, United
States v. Virginia's New GenderEqual Protection Analysis with Ramificationsfor Pregnancy, Parent-
ing; and Title V, 50 VANm. L. REv. 845, 883 (1997); Steven A. Delchin, Comment, United
States v. Virginia and Our Evolving "Constitution": Playing Peek-a-Boo with the Standard of Scru-
tiny for Sex-Based Classifications, 47 CASE. W. REs. L. REV. 1121, 1130-35 (1997). This Note
takes no position on this debate, but rather proceeds on the assumption that the standard
of review in gender discrimination cases remains the same.
415 See George C. Hiavac, Comment, Interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause: A Consti-
tutional Shell Game, 61 GEO. WASH. L. Rnv. 1349, 1378 (1993) ("The intermediate-scrutiny
test... has no basis whatsoever in precedent prior to Craig v. Boren, and is a much more
malleable test that permits judges' subjective preferences to come into play. It is necessary
to put an end to the Supreme Court's shell game. .. ." (footnotes omitted)).
416 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197; see also Scherr, supra note 24, at 192 (arguing that the
Supreme Court should expand the substantive due process framework to include interme-
diate scrutiny).
417 SeeJoHN E. NoWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CoNsTrrurIoNAL LAxV § 11.4, at 371
(4th ed. 1991). Professors Nowak and Rotunda note that the Supreme Court has not fully
embraced intermediate scrutiny.
The Supreme Court may be using the intermediate standard in both sub-
stantive due process and equal protection cases that involve a regulation or
impairment of fundamental constitutional rights. However, the Supreme
Court has not formally adopted the intermediate standard as the test to be
used in all fundamental rights cases.
Id.
418 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Con-
stitutionalRemedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 317 (1993). Professor Fallon is cognizant of the
perception that substantive due process is regarded as a two-tiered structure, but argues
that the articulated framework belies the actual scrutiny applied in different cases. See id.
at 314-15. Fallon discusses the use of an intermediate-type scrutiny within the contours of
the substantive due process doctrine:
[T]he Supreme Court has appeared to engage in an ad hoc balancing of
"the liberty (interest) of the individual" against "the demands of an organ-
ized society" in cases involving claims to avoid confinement in mental insti-
tutions, to be allowed to travel, to resist unwanted administration of
antipsychotic drugs, and to receive care and treatment while subject to gov-
ernment custody other than criminal incarceration. Ifjudicial scrutiny were
to reflect tiered assessments of the fundamentality of interests, those implicated in
these cases should probably be recognized as occupying an intermediate category, sub-
ject to something less than strict scrutiny but more than rational basis review.
Id. at 317 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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A law that burdens the ability of all persons to exercise a fundamen-
tal right will be examined under substantive due process. A law that
uses a classification that burdens or impairs the ability of only one
class of persons who wished to exercise a fundamental constitu-
tional right will be examined under equal protection. 419
Clearly, juvenile curfews burden the substantive due process
rights of one class of persons-juveniles. Consequently, equal protec-
tion is the more appropriate doctrinal mechanism to adjudicate these
claims. Equal protection adjudication provides lower courts with
Supreme Court precedent for applying the intermediate scrutiny stan-
dard while dispensing with the need to expand the substantive due
process framework to encompass the intermediate-scrutiny standard.
While common principles underlying both doctrines certainly may
support the expansion of substantive due process to include interme-
diate scrutiny,420 lower courts are on better legal footing using equal
protection analysis in the absence of a clear mandate from the
Supreme Court.
After determining that all three standards of review are available
under an equal protection analysis, this Note now focuses on the trig-
ger for heightened review. Because age is not a suspect class, courts
traditionally review age-based restrictions under the rational review
standard.42 1 Using this standard, the Supreme Court has upheld
mandatory retirement provisions for state police officers, 422 foreign
service officers, 42 3 and at one point, denied certiorari to review a case
involving mandatory retirement for elected state court judges.424
Hence, analysis under both equal protection and due process
turns on the same question: whether the curfew implicates any funda-
mental rights.42 5 However, because the Supreme Court has not for-
419 NowAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 417, § 14.3, at 579-80.
420 See Fallon, supra note 418, at 310 ("In its commonest form, substantive due process
doctrine reflects the simple but far-reaching principle-also embodied in the Equal Pro-
tection Clause-that government cannot be arbitrary."); see also Scherr, supra note 24, at
191-92 (advocating the expansion of the substantive due process framework to include
intermediate scrutiny). Discussion of the doctrinal integrity of the due process doctrine is
beyond the scope of this Note.
421 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991). "Suspect classifications" include
those based on race and national origin. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 417, § 14.3, at
575-76 (discussing suspect classifications).
422 See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 315-17 (1976) (up-
holding mandatory retirement provision that sets the retirement age for state police of-
ficers at 50).
423 See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111-12 (1979). In this case, foreign service of-
ficers challenged provisions that mandated retirement at age 60. They predicated their
equal protection claim on the fact that the retirement age for foreign service personnel
differed from the mandatory retirement age for general federal Civil Service personnel.
The Court rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection challenge under rational review. See id.
424 See Trafelet v. Thompson, 444 U.S. 906 (1979) (denying certiorari).
425 See NowAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 417, § 14.3, at 579-80.
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mally embraced the intermediate scrutiny standard under substantive
due process, 426 this Note focuses on the equal protection arguments
and the rights held directly by juveniles, rather than the parents' sub-
stantive due process right to rearing their children.427
One way to trigger heightened review a la Nunez is for a court to
classify the right to freedom of movement (or intrastate travel) as a
fundamental right.428 This approach, however, ignores several consti-
tutional questions that could have implications beyond the realm of
juvenile curfews.429 Assuming, arguendo, that the right to freedom of
movement (or intrastate travel) is not considered a fundamental
right, and that the curfew at issue excepts all fundamental rights from
its purview, it appears that the curfew would not trigger heightened
review. Supreme Court precedent, however, has triggered intermedi-
ate scrutiny in the absence of both suspect classifications and infringe-
ment of fundamental rights. For example, in Plyler v. Doe,430 the Court
applied intermediate scrutiny to strike down a Texas law that denied
school funding for the education of illegal immigrant children.431
The Court applied heightened review, even though it determined that
undocumented aliens were not a suspect class and education was not a
fundamental right.432 The Court held that the right to an education
was sufficiently important to warrant intermediate scrutiny.433 Simi-
larly, in the case of juvenile curfews, the right to freedom of move-
ment is, at a minimum, an important right, one "which is historically
part of the amenities of life."434 Coupled with the age classification,
the infringement of this admittedly important right suffices to trigger
intermediate scrutiny.435
426 See id. § 11.4, at 371.
427 See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Ed-
wards, CJ., concurring in part, concurring in result) (applying intermediate scrutiny based
on the recognition that "parental rights are implicated in this case and they are truly signif-
icant - indeed, these rights are at the core of our society's moral and constitutional fiber").
428 SeeNunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Qutb v. Strauss,
11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (triggering strict scrutiny based on the assumption, "with-
out [actually] deciding, that the right to move about freely is a fundamental right").
429 See Hangartner, supra note 39, at 216-27 (discussing the implications of a funda-
mental right of intrastate travel on police "sweep" tactics).
430 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
431 See id. at 223.
432 See id. at 223-24.
433 See id. at 223.
434 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972) (striking down va-
grancy law as unconstitutionally vague); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958) ("Free-
dom of movement is basic in our scheme of values."). But see Hutchins v. District of
Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Silberman, J.) (arguing that the vagrancy
cases do not support a fundamental substantive due process right to free movement be-
cause they were adjudicated under procedural due process).
435 See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 270 (3d Cir. 1990) (upholding "cruising"
ordinance under intermediate scrutiny). Cf Fallon, supra note 418, at 317 (arguing that
the Court's right-to-travel jurisprudence should "be recognized as occupying an intermedi-
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As a practical matter, limiting the intermediate scrutiny standard
to gender and illegitimacy cases would greatly minimize the utility of
such a mechanism by precluding its application when it is needed
most. Furthermore, limiting the application would run counter to the
current trend of expansion of the intermediate-scrutiny standard.436
The Supreme Court has already applied intermediate scrutiny to regu-
lations implicating the rights of minors in several cases, including: a
ban on public education for illegal immigrant minors,437 a classifica-
tion based on the illegitimacy of children,438 and a restriction on a
minor's right to obtain contraception. 439 Hence, applying the inter-
mediate scrutiny standard to adjudicate juvenile curfews would be in
accord with such decisions. Indeed, the recent trend in juvenile cur-
few challenges has been to apply intermediate scrutiny.440
Having determined that use of the intermediate scrutiny standard
is legally supportable, both by precedent and by analogy, this Note
returns to the question of its application. Before proceeding, how-
ever, the Note first considers the factual predicates of the juvenile
crime problem and how it relates to curfews.441 A look into the na-
ture ofjuvenile crime, including its sources, characteristics, and alter-
native measures of control, provides the background to ensure that
policymakers base curfews on "reasoned analysis rather than
assumptions."442
ate category, subject to something less than strict scrutiny but more than rational basis
review").
436 See Wexler, supra note 406, at 350 (advocating use of intermediate scrutiny standard
to adjudicate cases involving physician-assisted suicide and sexual orientation issues).
437 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (applying intermediate scrutiny to review
a burden on the right to public education for illegal immigrant minors).
438 See Lalli v. Lali, 439 U.S. 259, 267-68 (1978) (applying intermediate scrutiny to
review classification based on illegitimacy of children).
439 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 690-91, 695-96 (1977) (Brennan,
J., plurality opinion) (invalidating state law which prohibited sale of contraceptives to per-
sons under 16, while limiting persons over 16 to purchases from pharmacists).
440 See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc);
Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
1252 (1999).
441 This Note focuses on juvenile crime rather than juvenile delinquency as a whole.
Although the increase injuvenile crime over the past decade has been attributed to drugs
and guns, general juvenile delinquency has not been attributed to a single cause. See Co-
ORDINATING COUNCIL ON JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, COMBATING VIO-
LENCE AND DELINQUENCY THE NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE AcrION PLAN 7 (1996)
("Delinquents, especially chronic delinquents, exhibit a variety of social and psychological
deficits in their backgrounds. These deficits, often referred to as risk factors, stem from
breakdowns in five influential domains in juveniles' lives: neighborhood, family, school,
peers, and individual characteristics." (footnote omitted)).
442 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 144 F.3d 798, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rev'd en
bane, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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B. Identifying the Juvenile Crime Problem: Sources,
Characteristics, and Alternative Measures of Control
The general public views juvenile crime as a symptom of uncon-
trollable social decay. According to a recent Gallup poll, Americans
believe that juveniles are responsible for over 40% of all violent
crimes.443 The Office ofJuvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
tells a different story, one often ignored by the media hype: "[T]he
hyperbole and alarm that surround much of the political posturing
and new legislation obscure a simple fact: Very fewjuveniles engage in
criminal acts, especially violent criminal acts."44 4 For example, in
1995, juvenile offenders were responsible for only 14% of all homi-
cides in which the offender was identified.445 Although juveniles are
responsible for a relatively small percentage of violent crimes, the re-
cent, significant increases in juvenile crime rates are certainly cause
for alarm.446 The percentage gains in juvenile arrests have outpaced
rates for adults, particularly for violent offenses.4 7 Identifying the
source of the problem may provide some insight into how to address
the problem adequately.
The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention has
identified the source of the marked increase in juvenile crime as the
"interrelationship [between] .. .drugs, guns, andjuveniles." 448 Drug
traffickers solicit the assistance ofjuveniles as low-level dealers "partly
because they work[ ] for less, [take] greater chances, and [are] more
likely to escape detection and punishment."449 The increase in fire-
arms progressed naturally from the drug problem.450 Not surpris-
ingly, juvenile crime and victimization flourished in large, urban
centers.45 ' According to one study ofjuvenile crime in 1995, 84% of
the counties in the United States reported no juvenile murder victims
443 SeeJohn Gibeaut, Who's Raising the Kids?, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1997, at 62.
444 Rarome INrri&vTs: 1994-1996, supra note 3, at 3.
445 See 1997 Update on Violence, supra note 44, at 12.
446 See REFORM INrrIArs: 1994-1996, supra note 3, at 3 ("UJ]uveniles commit a pro-
portionately higher number of violent crimes than members of other age groups, and
since the mid-1980's, juvenile offenders have become increasingly violent.").
447 See id. ("The number of individuals of all ages arrested for murder and negligent
manslaughter increased approximately 23 percent between 1985 and 1994, while the
number ofjuveniles arrested for those crimes in the same period grew by 150 percent.").
448 Id. at 4; Fox Butterfield, Guns Blamed for Rise in Homicides by Youths in 80's, N.Y.
TAEs, Dec. 10, 1998, at A29 ("[Vlirtually all the increase in homicides byjuveniles in the
late 1980's was attributable to crimes committed with handguns, not to a change in the
nature of teen-agers."); see also David Byrd, Down, ButNot Ou NAT'LJ.,Jan. 16, 1999, at 115
(noting that contributing factors to the declining crime rate include the end of the urban
.crack cocaine epidemic" and an improving economy).
449 REFom lNrrzATivs: 1994-1996, supra note 3, at 4.
450 See id. at 4.
451 See id.
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and 9% reported only one.452 In comparison, more than one third of
all juvenile murder victims were killed in ten counties. Predictably,
these ten counties host major cities: Los Angeles, Chicago, New York,
Detroit, Dallas, Houston, Phoenix, San Bernardino, Philadelphia, and
St. Louis.
4 5 3
Juvenile crime and victimization also exhibit some identifiable
gender and racial characteristics. 454 According to national statistics,
"[m]ales were responsible for most of the growth in homicides by
juveniles from the mid-1980's through 1994."455 Furthermore, prior
to 1987, the total number of African-American and Caucasian youth
homicide offenders were roughly equal; after 1987, however, the
number of African-American youth homicide offenders outpaced
Caucasian youth homicide offenders.45 6 Finally, with regard to the
victims ofjuvenile homicide offenders, national statistics for 1995 bear
out the following facts: 85% of victims were male, 49% of victims were
African-American, 48% were Caucasian, approximately 30% were
under the age of 18, and 79% were killed with a firearm. 4 5 7
Given this background, the most logical approach to reducing ju-
venile crime and victimization would be to attack aggressively the
problems of guns and drugs. Another approach is to provide an out-
let for productive activities, such as midnight basketball leagues and
recreation centers.458 Probably the best approach, however, is to im-
pose a curfew on juvenile offenders as a condition of their proba-
tion.4 59 This idea has a certain intuitive appeal; it does not implicate
the rights of innocent juveniles, and it focuses directly on the night-
time activities of juvenile offenders. Structuring curfews in such a
manner would focus limited public resources on youths identified as
troubled, without unnecessarily restricting the activities ofjuveniles as
452 See 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE, supra note 44, at 2.
453 See id. The cities are listed in descending order according to the number ofjuve-
nile murder victims.
454 See OJJDP NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 24. With regard to juvenile victimiza-
tion, note the following- Until the age of 11, boys and girls are equally likely to be murder
victims; after the age of 11, male murder victimizations greatly outpace female murder
victimizations. See id.
455 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE, supra note 44, at 12.
456 See id. at 13.
457 See id. at 12.
458 See Michele Comandini, Coolest Place in Town: Residents' Effort to Open Recreation
CenterFils Void, REcoRD (Bergen County, NJ.), Dec. 3, 1998, at Ll. The article quoted one
12-year old as saying that "Itihis is the best program in town, and the whole school comes
here." I&; see also Trollinger, supra note 30, at 966 ("Vancouver, British Columbia, dis-
persed loitering teens by playing, twenty-four hours a day, the ballads of Perry Como and
Barry Manilow." (footnote omitted)).
459 See Freitas, supra note 49, at 244. The author argues that moving curfew authority
from municipalities to the juvenile court system will strike a balance between preventing
government intrusion of innocent youths, while still working toward the goal of reducing
juvenile crime and victimization.
2000]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
a class.460 Further, this approach minimizes the problem of usurping
parental authority because parents whose children have not been ad-
judicated delinquent would retain full discretion over their children.
One problem with justifying this approach as a means of reduc-
ing juvenile crime is that it would only affect previously convicted
juveniles. Hence, this approach would be ineffective in reducing the
crime rate for first-time offenders. Nevertheless, statistics tend to
show that chronic youth offenders "are responsible for the majority of
serious crimes committed." 461 The probationary curfew focuses pre-
cisely on that group. Furthermore, a probationary curfew would also
help reduce juvenile victimization because, as statistics tend to show,
juveniles engaging in violent criminal behavior constitute the largest
group of juvenile victims.462
Concerns expressed by cities that have enacted juvenile curfews
support the use of the probationary curfew in lieu of a generalized
juvenile curfew. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville,463 for example,
Charlottesville offered evidence indicating "a high rate of recidivism
among juveniles and a correlation between juvenile delinquency and
adult criminal activity."464 Using the city's own evidence, the plaintiffs
could have argued that the city should have addressed the problem of
recidivism with a probationary curfew rather than restricting the activ-
ities of all juveniles.
Experience has proven that utilizing curfews as a condition ofju-
venile probation works more effectively and efficiently than a genera-
lizedjuvenile curfew. For example, Boston has cut its juvenile (under
seventeen) murder rate by over 80% since 1990 by imposing a 9:00
P.M. curfew as a condition of probation for youth offenders.465 Proba-
460 See Curfew Ordinances, supra note 23, at 96-97:
Those children most likely to be deterred by the [curfew] ordinance... are
those least likely to engage in criminal activity. Conversely, those least likely
to be deterred are the same children who most probably would engage in
criminal activity. There is, however, one group .... [on] the "fringe" of the
delinquent community, who would be deterred from remaining away from
home at night by their parents if the threat of a sanction were available
against the parents .... [Hence], it certainly is not irrational for a legisla-
tive body to experiment with it in an attempt to stem an increase in juvenile
criminality.
Id.
461 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE, supra note 44, at 25.
462 SeeJon Marcus, Cleaning Up Crime In Boston, ScHoLASTc UPDATE, Nov. 2, 1998, at 8
("Most young killers and victims.. . were repeat criminals out on probation, flouting night-
time curfews.").
463 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1252 (1999).
464 Id. at 848.
465 See Marcus, supra note 462, at 8; see also Stephen Bennett, Operation Night Light Helps
Kee Probationers Honest, BosTON GLOBE (North), May 3, 1998, at 10 (detailing the success
of Boston's probationary-curfew program). Boston's success in Project Night Light has not
gone unnoticed; several other cities are following suit. See, e.g., Jim Keary, Youths on Proba-
[Vol. 85:518
JUVEMLE CURFEWS
tion officers stepped-up enforcement, focusing their efforts on identi-
fied troubled youths. 466 Undeniably, this reduction in the youth
crime rate is nothing short of remarkable.
Consequently, probationary curfews are not only less restrictive of
juvenile rights in general, they are also more effective in addressing
the state's legitimate interest. This fact strongly undermines the
Fourth Circuit's backup conclusion in Schleifer that the town's curfew,
"with its narrow scope and comprehensive list of exceptions, repre-
sents the least restrictive means to advance Charlottesville's compel-
ling interests."467 The success of probationary curfews suggests that
general juvenile curfews are not necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and hence invalid under the strict scrutiny standard.468 Nev-
ertheless, even courts that have invalidated juvenile curfews maintain
that under certain limited circumstances, a generalized juvenile cur-
few may be a valid exercise of a state's police power.469 The next sec-
tion discusses the application of the intermediate scrutiny standard to
juvenile curfew challenges and the baseline offers of proof necessary
to survive the standard.
C. Applying the Intermediate Scrutiny Standard
Given the fact that only a small percentage ofjuveniles engage in
criminal behavior, generalized curfews restrict the entire juvenile pop-
ulation for the criminal acts of a small minority.470 Nevertheless,
"[t]he Constitution certainly does not put legislatures to the choice of
solving the entirety of a social problem or no part of it at all." 471 As
one recent commentary expressed, "[C]urfews remain a limited and
inadequate response to the problems of [juvenile crime and victimiza-
tion]," but they "present both possibilities and perils and should be
tion to Get Curfew Checks, WAsH. TxiNs, Jan. 24, 1998, at All (reporting the District of Co-
lumbia's adoption of the Boston program); Elizabeth Mehren, Boston's Youth Violence
Program Becomes Model for Nation, L.A. TmfEs, Aug. 24, 1998, at A5; Jean Rimbach, Paterson
Effort Takes New Aim at Youth Crime REcoRD (Bergen County, NJ.), July 10, 1998, at L-1
(reporting adoption of pilot program in New Jersey).
466 See Marcus, supra note 462, at 8.
467 Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 852.
468 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 144 F.3d 798, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J.,
concurring) ("[S] trict scrutiny would require the District to meet the heavier burden of
demonstrating that the curfew is a less restrictive, more effective means of reducing juve-
nile crime and victimization than other alternatives, such as after school programs."), revd
en bane, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
469 SeeJohnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981)
("We express no opinion on validity of curfew ordinances narrowly drawn to accomplish
proper social objectives.").
470 See supra note 437 and accompanying text.
471 Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 851 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
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considered as one option [for] ... short- and long-term strategies." 4 72
Intermediate scrutiny provides courts with a mechanism to fairly and
carefully assess the coexistence of those "possibilities and perils."
The operative question remains: How specific do statistics prof-
fered by a state have to be to survive intermediate scrutiny? National
statistics illustrate a sharp peak in juvenile crime at 3:00 P.M. on
school days. 473 These statistics undercut the rationale that many cities
offer in support of juvenile curfews. Similarly, national statistics that
tend to show that seventeen-year olds are responsible for mostjuvenile
crimes474 raise serious questions about the efficacy of curfews that ex-
empt that age group. Consequently, this Note argues that legislatures
should support enactments of general juvenile curfews with specific,
localized juvenile crime and victimization statistics in order to ward off
possible constitutional invalidations.
Craig v. Boren, in which the Supreme Court applied the interme-
diate scrutiny standard, is particularly instructive.475 Craig involved a
challenge to an Oklahoma statute that prohibited males under the
age of twenty-one from purchasing "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer,
while the minimum age requirement for females was eighteen.476
The issue, the Supreme Court stated, was "whether such a gender-
based differential constitutes a denial to males [eighteen to twenty]
years of age of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 477 Aside from some basic differences, 478
the statistical issues implicated in Craig bear a striking resemblance to
those involved in juvenile curfew cases.
In recent juvenile curfew cases, the courts have cited the follow-
ing passage from Craig to support the proposition that specific and
detailed statistical information is not necessary to uphold juvenile
curfews:
It is unrealistic to expect either members of the judiciary or state
officials to be well versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical
472 Juvenile Curfews and Gang Violence, supra note 39, at 1709-10 (analyzing juvenile cur-
fews under the theoretical paradigms of civil libertarianism, communitarianism, and criti-
cal race theory).
473 See 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE, supra note 44, at 26. Adult violence, in contrast,
peaks at around 11:00 P.M. See id
474 See id. at 12 (providing statistics showing that 17-year olds are the largest age group
of youth murderers).
475 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
476 See id. at 192.
477 Id.
478 Craig involved a gender discrimination claim adjudicated under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, see id. at 204, whereas juvenile curfew challenges have been varied and incon-
sistent, see supra Part HI. Furthermore, Craig involved a gender-based differential age
classification, see Craig 429 U.S. at 192, whereas curfews differentiate ages without regard
to gender. Although classifications based on age are not suspect, juvenile curfews infringe
on the important, if not fundamental, right to freedom of movement.
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technique. But this merely illustrates that proving broad sociologi-
cal propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inev-
itably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the
Equal Protection Clause.479
While this argument seems persuasive on its face, context dictates
an alternative interpretation. The Court in Craig used this language
to invalidate the gender-based regulation despite the presence of
some statistics justifying differential treatment.48 0 Oklahoma offered
five different statistical surveys in support of its regulation: (1) a survey
of eighteen- to twenty-year olds detailing alcohol related driving of-
fenses; (2) a survey showing that youths ages seventeen to twenty-one,
especially males, were proportionally overrepresented among traffic
accident injuries and fatalities; (3) a roadside survey showing that
males were more likely than females to drink and drive; (4) nation-
479 Craig; 429 U.S. at 204 (footnote omitted). The literature is replete with commen-
tary cautioning the use of statistics in litigation. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-
Probability Evidence and the Appearance ofJustice, 103 HARv. L. REv. 530 (1989); Laurence H.
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. RExv. 1329
(1971). The nature of the statistics implicated in juvenile curfew adjudication differs, how-
ever, from the kind that causes consternation in the minds of scholars. Professor Tribe
explained:
My concern is with cases in which mathematical methods are turned to
the task of deciding what occurred on a particular, unique occasion, as op-
posed to cases in which the very task defined by the applicable law is that of
measuring the statistical characteristics or likely effects of some process or the statisti-
calfeatures of some population of people or events.
Tribe, supra, at 1338-39 (emphasis added).
The statistics implicated injuvenile curfew adjudication clearly fall within the italicized
phrase. Moreover, generalized juvenile curfews necessarily infringe upon the rights of in-
nocent minors. The purpose of requiring statistical data is to ensure that such measures
actually work toward the goal of reducing juvenile crime and victimization-to rationalize
the infringement upon the innocent minors. Because the enactment of curfews is often
driven in response to statistical increases in juvenile crime, a demand for particularized
information is not unreasonable. Indeed, such information lends itself particularly well to
quantitative analysis. Furthermore, relatively simple statistics can be used to determine
whether a curfew is having an effect on juvenile crime and victimization rates. Contrary to
the language in some judicial opinions, this would not require the judiciary "'to be well
versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical technique.'" See Schleifer v. City of Char-
lottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 849 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1252 (1999) (quoting
Craig, 429 U.S. at 204).
Although particularized statistics may be the best measure of the efficacy ofjuvenile
curfews, they are of course subject to error. One potential problem is isolating cause and
effect. A drop in juvenile crime in a particular community could be caused by a variety of
factors. But inquiry into the underlying assumptions of such statistics presumes that they
have been introduced or required in the first place. However, even a finding that a curfew
is a contributing cause to reduction of juvenile crime and victimization, if not the sole
cause, would arguably be sufficient. See also Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Court-
room, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1048 (1985) (noting the increased acceptance of statistical meth-
ods, but cautioning against abuse).
480 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 223-25 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 2% arrest
rate for males, in comparison to the .18% arrest rate among females, confirms that males
are much more likely to be arrested for "driving under the influence").
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wide FBI statistics showing an increase in drunk driving arrests; and
(5) statistical evidence gathered in other jurisdictions, tending to
show increased accidents resulting from youths drinking and
driving.481
The Court believed that only the first survey offered "the most
focused and relevant" evidence to the issue at bar.482 This survey
showed that .18% of females and 2% of males between eighteen and
twenty years of age were arrested for driving under the influence.483
Nevertheless, the Court struck down the regulation, holding that "if
maleness is to serve as a proxy for drinking and driving, a correlation
of 2% must be considered an unduly tenuous 'fit."' 48 4
The Court rejected the four other statistical surveys offered by
Oklahoma, concluding they offered "only a weak answer to the equal
protection question presented here."485 For example, the Court con-
cluded that the accident statistics for youths ages seventeen to twenty-
one, which showed that more males than females were killed and in-
jured, were weak justifications because they "drew no correlation be-
tween the accident figures for any age group and levels of intoxication
found in those killed or injured."486 These types of defects-relating
to age classifications and levels of intoxication-bear a striking simi-
larity to defects often found in juvenile curfew adjudication.
The Supreme Court in Craig noted that unless statistics are fo-
cused and relevant, they are not sufficiently probative of the local situ-
ation to withstand intermediate scrutiny.48 7 Similarly, in juvenile
curfew cases, specific statistics showing an appropriate correlation be-
tween the curfew and juvenile crime in the affected area should argua-
bly be required because national statistics tend to weaken the
justification for general juvenile curfews.488 Information regarding
the age of juvenile offenders and victims, as well as the time frame in
which juvenile crimes and victimizations are committed, is critical be-
cause it goes to the very heart of the curfew's justification. Despite its
cautionary language about proving sociological propositions with sta-
tistics, the Craig case supports this construction.489 The Craig Court,
in applying intermediate scrutiny, rejected certain statistical justifica-
tions proffered to justify the age-sex differential:
481 See id. at 200-01.
482 Id. at 201.
483 See id.
484 Id. at 201-02.
485 Id. at 201.
486 Id. at 201 n.9.
487 See id. at 201.
488 See supra Part V.B.
489 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 204.
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[M]any of the studies, while graphically documenting the unfortu-
nate increase in driving while under the influence of alcohol, make
no effort to relate their findings to age-sex differentials as involved
here. Indeed, the only survey that explicitly centered its attention
upon young drivers and their use of beer-albeit apparently not of
the diluted 3.2% variety-reached results that hardly can be viewed as
impressive in justifying either a gender or age classification.490
Similarly, general statistics should not be sufficient to justify a particu-
lar juvenile curfew. Rather, cities should be required to substantiate
the enactment of their curfews with age and time specific evidence.
Once sufficiently specific statistics are proffered, however, this Note
expresses no opinion about which percentages meet the "substantially
related" threshold, and which do not. Rather, the arguments in favor
of requiring detailed information are made to ensure that the legisla-
tures are acting on the basis of "reasoned analysis rather than assump-
tions.''491 In other words, detailed information best gauges the need
for or efficacy of the juvenile curfew. Detailed information disclosing
the time frame in which juvenile crime and victimization takes place
and the age group responsible will provide a proper baseline to make
that assessment.
CONCLUSION
Juvenile curfew adjudication suffers from pronounced confusion
over the appropriate constitutional standard. The recent decisions in
the Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits highlight this quandary. Never-
theless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to review the con-
stitutionality ofjuvenile curfews, leaving the lower courts to their own
devices. This Note has endeavored to reconcile this conflict, seeking
unifying principles through empirical, doctrinal, practical and prece-
dential analyses. In conclusion, this Note has found that intermediate
scrutiny is the best standard for lower courts to apply.
One source of confusion has been the Supreme Court case Bellotti
v. Baird, which elucidated criteria for when the courts should treat the
constitutional rights of minors with less favor than the rights of adults.
In the context of juvenile curfews, however, Bellotti's application has
been varied and inconsistent. Hence, Bellotti should be considered in
light of other Supreme Court jurisprudence that adjudicates the
rights of minors.
Despite inconsistencies in articulating proper constitutional stan-
dards, recent cases exhibit a clear trend toward some form of height-
490 See id at 203 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
491 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 144 F.3d 798, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-26 (1982)), rev'd en banc, 188 F.3d
531 (D.C. 1999).
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ened review.492 Two factors have arguably spurred this trend: (1) the
Bellotti case; and (2) the important rights that are being implicated
(i.e. right to freedom of movement). This Note has examined the
federal cases adjudicating juvenile curfews and found that a majority
ofjudges have chosen either strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny as
the appropriate constitutional standard. The cases that have articu-
lated strict scrutiny have exhibited textual departures from the nor-
mally rigorous standards involved in a strict-scrutiny analysis.
Furthermore, analysis of the applied strict scrutiny standards reveals
that juvenile curfews are subject to judicial inquiry more consistent
with the precepts of intermediate scrutiny.
Because juvenile curfews restrict the rights of a specific class of
persons, challenges are more properly analyzed under equal protec-
tion rather than substantive due process. Further, intermediate scru-
tiny has already been explicitly articulated within the strictures of
equal protection, whereas doctrinal purists would maintain that sub-
stantive due process remains a two-tiered structure, consisting of ra-
tional review and strict scrutiny. Since age is not a suspect
classification, and assuming that the curfew makes exceptions for all
fundamental rights, strict scrutiny is not warranted. In the context of
equal protection, however, the Supreme Court has applied intermedi-
ate scrutiny in the absence of both a suspect class and an infringement
on a fundamental right. In curfew laws, the synergy between the age
classification and the burden on the right to freedom of movement is
sufficient to trigger intermediate scrutiny. Hence, application of the
intermediate level of scrutiny to juvenile curfew challenges comports
with notions of justice for minors, while dispensing with the need to
expand the list of fundamental rights that would trigger a substantive
due process challenge.
The intermediate scrutiny standard provides lower courts with a
mechanism to balance the constitutional rights of minors with a city's
interest in reducing juvenile crime, reducing juvenile victimization,
and increasing parental responsibility. Recent cases illustrate that the
intermediate scrutiny standard is both practically workable and legally
supportable. Generally, cities are able to advance compelling state in-
terests that withstand strict scrutiny, which a fortiori withstand the in-
termediate standard. The second prong of intermediate scrutiny will
prove to be the decisive element in the equation. The inquiry will
hinge on the means-ends fit or, more specifically, whether sufficient
statistical support exists correlating the efficacy of the curfew with
both the age classifications and the time dimension ofjuvenile crime.
In view of the underlying causes of juvenile crime, the availability of
492 See supra Part IVA.1.
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other more efficient and less restrictive alternatives, and the fact that
only a small minority of juveniles engage in criminal activity, cities
should support their curfews with particularized, local statistics show-
ing a substantial relationship to their articulated purposes in order to
ward off possible constitutional invalidations.
